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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the development of cooperative maritime security efforts in 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Recent regional efforts to combat maritime security 
threats in the Gulf of Aden, and maritime piracy in particular, have drawn comparisons to 
similar efforts undertaken in the Malacca Straits. However, such comparisons fail to 
address the unique nature and history of security cooperation in the Persian Gulf, 
specifically the reliance of states in the region on external security support. Despite some 
similarities shared between the two regions, the states of the Persian Gulf must deal with 
issues of prioritization, regional animosities, and external dependence before they can 
attempt to develop cooperative maritime security arrangements akin to those existing in 
Southeast Asia. Success will require a concerted effort by states in the region and 
realization by the United States of its role in undermining effective security cooperation 
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A. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
On June 29, 2009, eleven Middle Eastern Arab states met in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia, to discuss the formation of an all-Arab maritime force to combat the continuing 
threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. This discussion was in 
response to a growing concern by the Arab community regarding the risk piracy posed to 
trade and security in the region, especially its threat to oil and gas shipments.1 Discussion 
of the task force’s formation can be seen as the culmination of several months of coaxing 
by the international community. It followed repeated actions by the United Nations 
calling for greater coordination and cooperation between regional and international actors 
able to operate in the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean.2  
The most recent of these actions took place in January 2009, when representatives 
from several Middle Eastern and East African states met in Djibouti to discuss possible 
regional cooperation in addressing maritime security problems, such as piracy.3 
Observers of this International Maritime Organization (IMO)-led conference pointed to 
the event as a precursor to a regional security arrangement similar to that established to 
                                                 
1 Paul Handley, “All-Arab Red Sea anti-piracy force proposed in Riyadh,” AFP, June 29, 2009, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hKNN5KXiu4QVATD7t4aO988SwvnQ (accessed 
August 24, 2009). 
2 In 2008, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolutions 1846 and 1851, calling for 
coordination and cooperation of all regional and international actors able to operate in the Gulf of Aden and 
East Indian Ocean to ensure the success of counter-piracy efforts. Resolutions 1846, 1851, and previous 
resolutions dealing with Somali piracy can be found at the UN Web site: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ 
unsc_resolutions08.htm. Similarly, in mid-January 2009, members of the new Contact Group on Piracy off 
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) met at the UN, to organize operational and information support for 
international counter-piracy operations and established processes for arrest and prosecution of suspected 
pirates. Representatives from several Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Oman, and the 
United Arab Emirates joined those from all the major actors contributing resources to the effort. DOS, “The 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,” Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs Press 
Release, May 18, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/ 123584.htm (accessed September 02, 
2009); David Osler, “Piracy contact group launched,” Lloyd’s List, January 15, 2009, http://www. 
lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=2 (accessed August 24, 2009). 
3 Signatories of the Djibouti Code of Conduct include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Yemen.  Several Arab countries 
attended but were not signatories, including Egypt, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. UN New Centre, 
“Regional States sign pact to fight piracy off Somali coast – UN,” UN News Service, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp ?NewsID=29725&Cr=&Cr1= (accessed  August 24, 2009). 
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combat piracy in the Malacca Straits. That agreement, the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP),4 
established procedures for coordination and information sharing between states in the 
region, and was widely credited with the reduction of piracy in the Straits of Malacca.5  
Such comparisons between the relatively successful counter-piracy efforts of Southeast 
Asia and the fledgling arrangements of the Middle Eastern Arab states highlight the main 
questions of this thesis: Can Middle Eastern countries establish an effective and 
sustainable, cooperative arrangement to address maritime security problems in the 
region? Specifically, is the Southeast Asian model of maritime security cooperation 
applicable to similar efforts being discussed in the Middle East by some of the Persian 
Gulf states? If so, what lessons can strategic decision-makers and military leadership 
concerned with the region derive from the cooperative security efforts in the Southeast 
Asian maritime domain? 
This thesis will argue that despite recent announcements regarding a dedicated 
Arab maritime task force to cooperatively address maritime security issues in the region, 
the Gulf states possess neither the capacity nor the willingness to do so effectively. 
Although comparisons between cooperative maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia 
provide a convenient and informative “model” for counter-piracy efforts in the Middle 
East, the Gulf states find themselves in a unique situation. Few states in the region 
possess sufficient maritime forces to operate outside their own territorial waters. More 
importantly, several key political factors prevent states in the region from developing 
effective cooperative security arrangements. The factors most affecting these efforts are 
related to prioritization of internal and eternal security, poor relations between regional 
neighbors, and overdependence on foreign security assistance. 
                                                 
4 See the ReCAAP Web site for more information, http://www.recaap.org/index_home.html (accessed 
March 15, 2010). 
5 Lauren Ploch et al., “Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional 
Research Service (April 21, 2009): 18–19. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
Despite increased efforts by the UN, European Union (EU), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States, piracy off the Somali coast continues 
to be a significant issue. International response to the situation, in the form of increased 
naval presence, has failed to reduce piracy in the region. In fact, over the first three 
months of 2009 alone there were 61 reported attacks, over ten times that seen during the 
same period the year before (See Figure 1).6  
 
 
Figure 1.   Maritime Violence off Somalia (1998–2009)7 
Additionally, the economic benefits of piracy continue to be a significant issue 
with ransom payments in 2008 estimated to have been somewhere between 18 to 30 
                                                 
6 IMB, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period, 1 January – 31 March 
2009,” International Maritime Bureau report (April 2009): 8. 
7 NOTE: Table 1 shows the number of actual or attempted piracy attacks in or around the Horn of 
Africa from 1998–2009.  SOURCE: Figures were compiled from the ICC International Maritime Bureau. 
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report. UK: IMB, 1998 to 2009. Reports can be found at 
www.icc-ccs.org.   
 4
million USD.8  Besides the immediate cost of ransom payments, the maritime shipping 
industry faces potential increases in insurance premiums if they elect to continue transits 
of the region, and increased operating costs if forced to bypass the Suez Canal and GOA.  
Recent estimates from Lloyd’s of London, a major insurer of commercial vessels, show 
an increase in average insurance premiums from 500 USD in 2007 to 20,000 USD in 
2008 for vessels operating in the GOA, an estimated cost of 400 million USD annually.9  
Conversely, operators who wish to bypass the region altogether have one option, a long 
voyage of over 2,700 nautical miles around the Cape of Good Hope.  This voyage, 
although safer, takes six more days than the Suez and GOA route and is projected to cost 
significantly more, close to 89 million USD annually (industry-wide) in added cost.10 
To be sure, piracy in the Gulf of Aden and along the east African coast affects 
stability in the region, threatens vital aid from reaching the people of Somalia, and 
presents serious challenges to the world maritime economy.  These effects, though not 
usually affecting U.S. citizens or commercial entities directly, cause significant issues for 
maritime trade in the global market, which in turn, has repercussions for the U.S. 
economy and the economies of its Persian Gulf and African allies. Although it can be 
debated to exactly what extent piracy directly affects the economies of the Middle East, it 
is obvious that the phenomenon does have important political and social effects for these 
countries. With several vessels from Middle Eastern countries having been hijacked in 
                                                 
8 According to IMB reporting, there were 111 reports of actual and attempted attacks against merchant 
shipping in the GOA and Indian Ocean in 2008, over two times the numbers from previous years (44 in 
2007, 20 in 2006, 45 in 2005, 10 in 2004, and 21 in 2003). IMB, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships: Report for the Period, 1 January – 31 December 2008,” ICC International Maritime Bureau (January 
2009): 5. *These figures may be deceptive, however, industry representatives interviewed by the author 
agreed that prior to the recent increase in high-profile attacks, and subsequent notoriety of the piracy 
problem, reporting from shipping companies and shipmasters was notoriously unreliable. Discussions 
between the author and representatives of maritime industry, the IMO and IMB took place during the 
“Tackling Piracy at Sea” Conference in London, March 18–19, 2009. Financially, experts disagree on the 
exact amount of ransoms paid out to Somali pirates with some estimating total payments in the range of 
18–30 million USD.  Major news services and other media outlets tend to estimate based on average 
ransom paid and number of vessels held for the year. Roger Middleton, “Piracy in Somalia: Threatening 
global trade, feeding local wars,” Chatham House Briefing Paper, London (October 2008), 5. 
9 “The Long Way Around,” Lloyd's List, November 26, 2008; “Piracy Could Add $400m to Owners’ 
Insurance Cover Costs,” Lloyd's List, November 21, 2008. 
10 “Economic Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global Trade,” US Maritime Industry Report, 
December 23, 2008, http://marad.dot.gov/documents/HOA_Economic%20Impact%20of%20Piracy.pdf 
(accessed March 6, 2009). 
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the past few years, these countries undoubtedly experience some pressure to address the 
issue.11 These states have also been under continuous pressure by the UN and other 
international powers to contribute in a coordinated manner. Therefore, analysis of Middle 
Eastern capacity to conduct sustained and coordinated counter-piracy operations as a 
joint force, the effect such operations may have on developing broader cooperative, 
maritime security arrangements, and the applicability of previous experiences of 
establishing such arrangements, would provide policy-makers and operational 
commanders with essential data to support future efforts. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
This thesis seeks to determine the feasibility of cooperative, maritime security 
arrangements in the Middle East similar to those currently existing in Southeast Asia. 
Favorable comparisons between the two, as discussed in the previous section, are often 
presented as models for similar efforts in the Middle East. Policy-makers and experts see 
such measures as important steps toward not only addressing the short-term issue of 
piracy and maritime crime, but also addressing possibilities of regional cooperative 
maritime security in the long-term. It is not clear whether these comparisons are accurate. 
This thesis will seek to identify the key characteristics that have allowed for successful 
cooperation in Southeast Asia, whether those characteristics exist in the Middle East, and 
what affect these have on cooperative security development in the region. 
To facilitate this research, a historical analysis of each region was conducted to 
determine the key similarities and differences applicable to understanding cooperative 
                                                 
11 According to IMB statistics for 2008, five vessels registered in Middle Eastern Arab countries were 
hijacked or attacked in that year: Two from Yemen and one each from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. 
In the period of 2003 to 2008, 29 Arab-owned or registered vessels have been attacked (this number is 
worldwide with further analysis required to identify the actual number attacked as a result of Somali 
piracy). The most high profile of these cases was the M/V Sirius Star, a very large crude carrier (VLCC) 
that was hijacked by Somali pirates in November 2008 and later ransomed for a reported three million 
USD. The Sirius Star, owned by a UAE based company that is a subsidiary of the Saudi Arabian state oil 
company, Saudi Aramco, was carrying close to two million barrels of crude oil bound for the US. IMB, 
“Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period, 1 January – 31 December 2008,” ICC 
International Maritime Bureau (January 2009): 18–19; BBC, “Pirates capture Saudi oil tanker,” BBC 
News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7733482.stm (accessed August 20, 2009); BBC, “Saudi tanker 
'freed off Somalia,'“ BBC News, January 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7820311.stm (accessed 
August 20, 2009). 
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security development in each. This analysis seeks to identify the characteristics of each 
region to include the progression of counter-piracy efforts, the factors that influence 
cooperative efforts in each region, and the effect both have had on maritime security 
cooperation overall. It will focus on events observed during spikes in reported attacks in 
each region since 1998, specifically from 1998 to present in Southeast Asia and from 
2001 to present off the Horn of Africa (HOA). This historical analysis will be used in 
conjunction with theoretical models of cooperative security to identify the key factors 
that contribute or hinder effective security cooperation in each region. 
This thesis will be organized into six chapters. This introductory chapter explains 
the purpose and importance of this topic, including the methodology that will be utilized 
to conduct the comparison between efforts in both regions. Chapter II will provide a 
review of relevant literature on the topic, with the purpose of providing background on 
the discussion between experts and its bearing on this thesis. The third and fourth 
chapters will provide background on the development of counter-piracy in both regions 
respectively. They will provide an overview of the steps taken to address piracy over the 
last several years. Chapter V will provide an overview of maritime security and 
geopolitical issues within the Middle East to include a background on maritime capacity 
in the region and a summary of factors related to security cooperation between states in 
the region. The final chapter will compare the nature of security in both regions to 
determine the similarities and differences between the two, and the applicability of the 
Southeast Asian “model” to cooperative efforts in the Middle East. This will include 
recommendations for policy-makers and a discussion of possible topics of further 
research. 
 7
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Piracy has garnered a significant amount of attention over the past few years. 
Most of this attention has come because of the dramatic increase in attacks off the Horn 
of Africa and the resulting increase in media exposure to the problem. The goal of this 
chapter is to provide background on the resulting literature, especially with regards to 
piracy’s effect on regional security cooperation. It will first outline discussions within 
academic and policy circles on how to best address maritime security issues like piracy. It 
will then detail the use of the Southeast Asian “model” as a case for comparison and 
emulation by some of the same circles. This will be followed by a discussion on some 
theories of cooperative security to include identification of key factors that hinder or aid 
development of regional cooperation. The final two sections will outline the application 
of some of these metrics by scholars and regional experts and how they affect security 
cooperation in both regions.  
B. MODERN PIRACY AND COUNTER-PIRACY 
Somali piracy has garnered a significant amount of attention over the past few 
years despite previously being ignored during the first few years of the 21st century. 
Until recently, discussion on the topic had been strictly limited to organizations 
specifically interested in maritime security issues, such as the U.S. Navy, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (ICC IMB). Such groups obviously had a 
vested interest in the topic: U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) in 
understanding and countering a maritime problem in its area of operations, the IMO 
dedicated to developing and maintaining global maritime security, and the IMB seeking 
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to protect the interests of international trade and the maritime shipping industry.12 
However, as pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean became more high 
profile, the international media and, in turn, the general public, became more aware of the 
issue and international pressure for intervention began to grow.13 
Scholars and security experts quickly agreed that Somali piracy was a unique 
phenomenon, that the combination of lawlessness and economic disadvantage inherent 
within and surrounding the collapsed state of Somalia provided an ideal environment for 
piracy to exist.14 To some, the logical way to eliminate Somali piracy was to provide 
sustained security, economic stability, and an opportunity to establish centralized control  
 
                                                 
12 Piracy has long been a maritime industry issue.  Guidance from the International Maritime 
Organization from 2002 discusses the various measures a ship captain can take to prevent or reduce the 
likelihood of attacks.  Additionally, industry organizations like the Oil Companies International Marine 
Forum (OCIMF) released guidance in 2009 for masters transiting through the area.  “Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships,” IMO Guidance Circular, International Maritime Organization, May 29, 2002; 
OCIMF, Piracy – The East Africa/Somalia Situation: Practical Measures to Avoid, Deter or Delay Piracy 
Attacks, Oil Companies International Marine Forum (Edinburgh: Witherby Seamanship International Ltd, 
2009): 1–42. 
13 Of special importance were several events that illustrated the expansion of the pirate’s range and 
targeting: the hijacking of Le Ponant, a French luxury yacht, the Faina, a vessel loaded with Russian tanks, 
the Sirius Star, a Saudi supertanker carrying oil to the U.S., and the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama, a 
Danish cargo vessel with an American crew. Each of these attacks illustrated a specific threat to shipping, 
whether to civilian tourists or American citizens, global energy interests, or arms shipments; evidence that 
the pirates were expanding beyond previously preferred targets: illegal fishing boats and small cargo 
vessels carrying UN World Food Programme (WFP) shipments. AP, “France: Pirates Captured, Hostages 
Freed,” Associated Press, CBS News, April 11, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/11/ 
world/main4009248.shtml (accessed September 4, 2009); BBC, “Pirates capture Saudi oil tanker,” BBC 
News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7733482.stm (accessed August 20, 2009); BBC, “Saudi tanker 
'freed off Somalia,'“ BBC News, January 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7820311.stm (accessed 
August 20, 2009); Larry McShane, “Navy ship arrives to aide American crew that fought off Somali 
pirates,” New York Daily News, April 9, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/us_world/2009/04/ 
08/2009-04-08_somali_pirates_seize_usflagged_cargo_ship_with_21_american_sailors_says_diplomat. 
html#ixzz0Q59g7AjV (accessed September 4, 2009). 
14 Literature from institutions such as Chatham House, Jane’s Defence Group and the RAND 
Corporation focus primarily on Somali piracy’s role in increasing instability in the region, blaming the rise 
in piracy to the social and economic state of modern Somalia. Peter Chalk, “The Maritime Dimension of 
International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States,” RAND Corporation 
Report (2008), www.rand.org; Bruno Schiemsky, “Piracy’s rising tide – Somali piracy develops and 
diversifies,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Jane’s Information Group (January 16, 2009), 
http://search.janes.com; Roger Middleton, Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local 
Wars, Chatham House Briefing Paper (October 2008), 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/665/. 
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of the country by a Somali government.15 However, while most agreed that the root 
causes of piracy should be addressed, they also agreed that the task of internally 
stabilizing Somalia was too difficult to handle presently. James Kraska and Brian Wilson, 
two U.S. naval officers who have written extensively on Somali piracy, stressed in early 
2009 that “until the world can effectively craft and execute a long-term solution… the 
problem of piracy must be addressed from the sea to the shore rather than the other way 
around.”16 To Kraska and many other policy experts, counter-piracy efforts should be 
focused on bolstering military and law enforcement action designed to disrupt and 
disincentivize the act of piracy itself.17  
C. THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS 
Representatives from a wide range of organizations did agree that immediate 
action was required to stem the rise in pirate attacks off of Somalia regardless of the 
situation within the country. In a 2008 policy document, “Countering Piracy Off the Horn 
of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan,” the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) called 
for “three distinct lines of action”: reduce the vulnerability of maritime shipping to 
piracy, interrupt and deter attacks within the auspices of international law, and ensure 
development of an internationally recognized framework for arrest and prosecution of 
pirates. Within these lines of action, the NSC plan called for cooperative arrangements to 
streamline counter-piracy operations and the establishment of a regionally based Counter 
                                                 
15 Lauren Gelfand, “Somalia’s volatility must be tackled at its roots,” in Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jane's 
Information Group (December 19, 2008), http://search.janes.com; John R. Bolton, “Dealing with Somalia 
and Its Piracy,” in San Diego Union-Tribune, January 11, 2009; Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks to United 
Nations Security Council by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,” December 16, 2008. 
16 James Kraska et al., “Maritime Piracy in East Africa,” in Journal of International Affairs, 62:2 
(Spring 2009), 58. 
17 US National Security Council, “Countering Piracy Off The Horn Of Africa: Partnership & Action 
Plan,” (December 2008), www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Countering_Piracy_Off_The_Horn_of_Africa_-
_Partnership__Action_Plan.pdf; Stephanie Hanson, “Combating Maritime Piracy,” CFR Backgrounder, 
Council on Foreign Relations (January 27, 2009) http://www.cfr.org/publication/18376/combating 
_maritime_piracy.html.; Roger Middleton, “Pirates and How to Deal With Them,” Briefing Note, Chatham 
House, April 22, 2009, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13845_220409pirates_law.pdf (accessed 
April 25, 2009); ICG, “Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State,” Africa Report No. 147, International 
Crisis Group (December 23, 2008): 21–22; James Kraska et al., “Fighting Piracy,” in Armed Forces 
Journal (February 2009), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/02/3928962.  
 10
Piracy Coordination Center (CPCC) tasked to collect reporting, disseminate information 
to forces in the region, and provide a “common operating picture.”18  
The next year the United Nations established the Contact Group on Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to “facilitate discussion and coordination of actions among 
states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia.”19 Since inception, 
the CGPCS has primarily served as a forum for international cooperation; providing an 
opportunity for the international community to discuss increased naval coordination, 
promote preventative efforts within the maritime industry, facilitate legal solutions 
pertaining to captured pirates, and increasing maritime capacity in the region.20 
Following the first meeting of the CGPCS in January 2009, Stephanie Hanson, an analyst 
for the Council on Foreign Relations, highlighted four “mechanisms for combating 
piracy”: adoption of onboard deterrents or defensive countermeasures for shipping 
transiting the region, deployment of international and regional naval forces to deter and 
prevent attacks, creation of a Somali coast guard funded and trained by the international 
community, and establishment of regional counter-piracy patrols based on those in place 
in the Malacca Straits since 2006.21  
Hanson’s last point highlights a comparison that has become popular in recent 
literature on counter-piracy. During this time, authors began pointing to the success of 
cooperative security arrangements in Southeast Asia as a possible example for addressing 
the same issue off HOA.22 The most often referenced of these arrangements was the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
                                                 
18 US National Security Council, “Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” 7–14.  
19 “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,” U.S. Department of State Factsheet, January 
14, 2009, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/121054.htm (accessed November 4, 2009).  
20 “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: List of Participating States and Organizations at 
the 4th Plenary,” U.S. Department of State Press Release, September 10, 2009, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/ othr/misc/129273.htm (accessed November 4, 2009). 
21 Hanson, “Combating Maritime Piracy,” 3. 
22 In a 2009 commentary, Joshua Ho advocates that policy-makers developing counter-piracy policy 
for the HOA to “go local” and emulate the successes of Southeast Asian cooperative efforts. Joshua Ho, 
“Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Lessons from the Malacca Strait,” RSIS Commentaries, S, Rajaratnam School 
of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, January 22, 2009, 3. 
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ships in Asia (ReCAAP), an aptly named initiative introduced by the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and established in 2006.23  
Regional experts and the international community alike have heralded ReCAAP 
as an example of effective security cooperation and coordination.24 Joshua Ho, a 
Singaporean scholar who has written extensively on ReCAAP and other maritime 
security issues in the region, has repeatedly lauded the efforts of the organization, 
although he freely admits that it does possess worrisome flaws.25 James Kraska and 
Brian Wilson often cite ReCAAP as the prime example for cooperative maritime security 
with regards to counter-piracy.26 The international community has also been especially 
quick to acclaim ReCAAP’s applicability to similar deliberations in the Middle East. In 
January 2009, for example, the International Maritime Organization acclaimed meetings 
held in Djibouti to discuss regional cooperation as the first step toward a similar 
cooperative agreement in the Middle East and East Africa.27  
To advocates of the cooperative regional approach, key aspects of ReCAAP were 
especially informative. First was the formal development of a regional arrangement and 
the normative expectations the agreement represented.28 Second was the need for 
formalized communication and information sharing in the form of regional coordination 
                                                 
23 ReCAAP called for cooperative security patrols around the Malacca Straits and established a 
network of regional centers designed to provide information on attacks and partner actions to an 
Information Sharing Centre (ISC). Joshua Ho, “Combating piracy and armed robbery in Asia: The 
ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC),” in Marine Policy 33 (2009), 432. 
24 James Jay Carafano et al., “Maritime Security: Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond,” 
Heritage Special Report, SR-59, Heritage Foundation (June 24, 2009): 19–20; Raymond Gilpin, “Counting 
the Costs of Somali Piracy,” United States Institute of Peace Working Paper, USIP (June 22, 2009); Mark 
J. Valencia, et al., “The Somalia Multilateral Anti-Piracy Approach: Some Caveats,” from Nautilus 
Institute, Policy Forum Online 09-012A, February 12, 2009, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09012 
ValenciaKhalid.htm  (accessed August 10, 2009); Lars Bangert Struwe, “For a Greater Horn of Africa Sea 
Patrol: A Strategic Analysis of the Somali Pirate Challenge,” Danish Institute for Military Studies (March 
2009), 29.  
25 Ho, “Combating piracy and armed robbery in Asia,” 433. 
26 James Kraska, et al., “Combating pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Djibouti Code and the Somali 
Coast Guard,” in Ocean and Coastal Management XXX (2009), 4–5; Kraska et al., “Fighting Piracy,” 2. 
27 UN New Centre, “Regional States sign pact to fight piracy off Somali coast – UN,” UN News 
Service, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29725&Cr=&Cr1= (accessed  August 24, 2009). 
28 Struwe, “For a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol,” 29; Carafano et al., “Maritime Security: Fighting 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond,” 19. 
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centers and official lines of communication. According to proponents, both 
characteristics are key to the success of the organization. By emulating the states of 
Southeast Asia, they argued, the states in the Middle East and Northeast Africa could take 
great strides toward curbing piracy and maritime crime in their waters.29  
D. THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN “MODEL” 
Despite enthusiasm from some, others have argued that the example of ReCAAP 
might not be directly applicable to developing arrangements in the Middle East. Even 
supporters of the ReCAAP effort overall admitted that the agreement has had its flaws. 
Joshua Ho identifies three factors that limited the agreement’s success: lack of an 
operational role, a non-obligatory nature, and the absence of key states in the agreement. 
After providing a litany of the organization’s strengths, Ho accedes that the 
organization’s lack of an operational role limits the effectiveness of forces depending on 
the expected level of operational coordination. He continues by describing the agreement 
as a “paper tiger,” possessing no authority to require coordination or action from its 
members.30 Due to the loose terms of the agreement, members have no obligation to 
abide by it, a characteristic some supporters view as a strength of the organization.31 The 
final limiting factor is the absence of Indonesia and Malaysia in the agreement, the two 
countries whose waters comprise a majority of the Straits of Malacca. Their absence calls 




                                                 
29 Struwe, “For a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol,” 29; Carafano et al., “Maritime Security: Fighting 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond,” 20. 
30 Ho, “Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia: Boosting ReCAAP’s Role.” John F. Bradford 
also identified this shortcoming in an article from 2005, where he lauded ReCAAP as a “positive step” but 
criticized the lack of member obligations beyond information-sharing. John F. Bradford, “The Growing 
Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” Naval War College Review 58:3 (Summer 
2005), 69. 
31 Victor Huang, a Singaporean naval officer, disagrees with Ho’s statement here, attributing the 
success of ReCAAP to the looseness of the agreement and its limitation to “operational information sharing 
and low-level, nonmilitary assistance.” Victor Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: 
Outsiders Not Welcome?” Naval War College Review 61:1 (Winter 2008), 99. 
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maritime crime in the Straits.32 As Cara Raymond adds in a 2009 article on piracy in the 
Malacca Straits, the absence of Indonesia and Malaysia “cannot help but cast doubt on its 
[ReCAAP’s] effectiveness.”33  
Less known, and arguably more informative, is the evolution of other efforts at 
maritime cooperation between the states in the region. Recent literature has begun to 
describe this evolutionary process, heralding a succession of cooperative agreements 
between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand as a more applicable example of 
maritime security cooperation.34 The first of these was MALSINDO (an acronym for the 
first three states involved: Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore). This trilateral agreement 
was established in 1999 and coordinated maritime patrols in the Malacca Straits, building 
on existing bilateral agreements between the three states. MALSINDO was followed by 
the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) and the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (MSSP), efforts that 
built upon the successes of the initial agreement. The most recent of these agreements, 
the MSSP, was more effective than its predecessors, especially following its integration 
with a new information-sharing initiative, the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG), and 
joint maritime air patrols, the Eyes in the Sky Initiative (EiS), forming the Joint 
Coordination Committee (JCC) in 2006.35  
                                                 
32 Ho, “Combating piracy and armed robbery in Asia: The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre 
(ISC),” 433. 
33 Catherine Zara Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Straits,” Naval War College 
Review 62:3 (Summer 2009), 39. 
34 Victor Huang describes initiatives like MSP and ReCAAP, as “bottom-up” efforts, where the states 
initiate cooperation through a series of small steps. In the case of MSP, the Malacca Strait states built upon 
existing bilateral relationships, expanding into the multilateral organization that exists presently. Huang, 
“Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?” 97. Tamara Renee Shie’s 
chapter in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits also provides a concise 
chronology of the evolution of counter-piracy cooperation in the region. Tamara Renee Shie, “Maritime 
Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and Progress of Intra-ASEAN Cooperation,” in Piracy, Maritime 
Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb  (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 178; See also Vivian Forbes’ book, Conflict and Cooperation in Managing 
Maritime Space in Semi-Enclosed Seas, for a thorough timeline and explanation of cooperative agreements 
between states in the region. Vivian Louis Forbes, Conflict and Cooperation in Managing Maritime Space 
in Semi-Enclosed Seas  (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001), 122–123. 
35 Ho, “Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Lessons from the Malacca Strait,” 3; Donald Urquhart, “Malacca 
Strait air and sea patrols brought under one umbrella,” The Business Times (Singapore), April 22, 2006; 
Zakaria Abdul Wahab, “Thailand Joins In The Patrol Of Malacca Straits,” Bernama, September 18, 2008 
(translated text provided by BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
September 19, 2008. 
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Joshua Ho highlighted the success of these efforts, attributing it to the willingness 
of participants to address issues of sovereignty while still increasing coordination 
between their forces. To both Ho and Huang, the key to its success was the limitation of 
naval patrols to their respective territorial water, thereby addressing fears of infringement 
on national sovereignty while still increasing coordination between patrolling forces.36 
There are those who disagree, however, characterizing the Malacca Straits patrols as 
more “show” than providing “real utility.”37 Some claim that this coordination merely 
consisted of an “exchange of schedules” rather than a truly cooperative effort.38  
There are also those who view the establishment of these agreements as merely 
political maneuvering. J.N. Mak, a scholar of maritime security issues in the region, 
criticized MALSINDO in 2006, stating that the purpose of the agreement was not 
necessarily to curb maritime violence, but to “forestall possible foreign intervention in 
the Malacca Straits.”39 
Concerns regarding the level of success of regional security cooperation in 
Southeast Asia aside, comparisons between them and similar agreements developing in 
the Middle East seem valid. Therefore, an analysis of the factors that either limited or 
encouraged cooperation between states in Southeast Asia would be informative. Recent 
literature on the subject tends to agree that certain obstacles hindered cooperation in the 
region. The first deals with issues of maritime capacity: physical capability, training, and 
platforms, all the things that determine a state’s ability to carry out its security intentions. 
Most states in the region lack adequate vessels and personnel to patrol their waters. 
Indonesia and Malaysia have both dealt with inadequate capacity, admitting publicly that 
                                                 
36 Ho, “Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Lessons from the Malacca Strait,” 2–3. Huang, 96–97. 
37 Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 68–69. 
38 From privileged interviews conducted by John F. Bradford, cited in “Growing Prospects for 
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they lacked the forces necessary to adequately patrol their own waters.40 Carolin Liss and 
others attribute their inadequate maritime capacity to a general lack of resources 
following the financial crisis in the late 1990s and the states’ preoccupation with internal 
stability.41 
Considering this general lack of regional maritime capacity, related literature 
often stresses the need for continued international assistance to ensure success in the 
region including all measures of capacity building such as training, equipping, and 
surveillance and reconnaissance.42 Kraska and Wilson point to existing capacity-building 
programs in the region, particularly those of the United States and Japan, as lending 
significantly to the transformation of maritime forces in the region.43 
The second obstacle to regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia deals with 
the broader issue of political willingness. Political willingness, in this context, alludes to 
the internal and external political concerns that prevent or hinder a state’s decision to 
participate in a cooperative arrangement. Three specific political issues remain constant 
throughout all current literature and explain the hesitance of states in the region to 
cooperate, including: internal distractions, poor relations with neighbors, and “meddling” 
by external actors.  
Internal distractions. States in the region have been focused on internal stability, 
especially following the financial crisis of the late 1990s. Economic depression and the 
resulting poverty and unemployment were beyond the control of most states in the region. 
                                                 
40 Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Straits,” 36. 
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The financial crisis drained vital resources and weakened economies throughout the 
region. Political opposition within their borders further distracted the states, drawing 
resources from less urgent issues, such as maritime crime and border patrols. Most 
notably, until 2004, Indonesia was faced with armed opposition in the northeast portion 
of the country and, as a result, had little control over security in that area.44 Organized 
crime has become another distraction as transnational criminal groups have proliferated 
throughout the region, testing the mettle of law enforcement agencies region-wide.45 
Faced with a wide range of internal distractions, states in the region were spread 
exceedingly thin, as evidenced by the dramatic rise in illegal fishing, smuggling, and 
piracy in the Straits. 
Poor relations with neighbors. Mistrust between states in the region has limited 
cooperation for several decades. Animosity between neighbors resulting in border 
disputes and frigid relations was particularly disruptive. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand have all experienced conflicts between them. Issues of national sovereignty, 
territorial waters and maritime boundaries, in this case, are a matter of fact. States in the 
region were slow to address these issues, making them a significant hindrance to further 
cooperative efforts.46 Some critics question the success of the agreements themselves, 
highlighting the mainly political utility of ReCAAP. According to Liss and Vavro, 
participants merely acted out their part, scheduling joint patrols and establishing new 
initiatives that did little to curb maritime crime in the region. Recent coordinated efforts, 
such as joint patrols, were viewed as merely exercises in sharing schedules, but lacking 
observable coordination between the participants.47 
Meddling by external actors. Relations with external actors have also adversely 
affected cooperation in the region. Efforts at assistance or coordination have often been 
                                                 
44 Carolin Liss, “The roots of piracy in Southeast Asia,” Austral Policy Forum 07–18A, Nautilus 
Institute, October 22, 2007, 7–8. 
45 Ibid., 6. 
46 Vavro, “Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of Power in the Malacca Strait,” 13–14; Mak, 
“Unilateralism and Regionalism,” 135. 
47 Liss, “The Challenges of Piracy in Southeast Asia and the Role of Australia,” 3–4; Vavro, “Piracy, 
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perceived at attempts to “meddle” in Southeast Asian affairs. National sovereignty is a 
sensitive issue for all countries when dealing with extra-regional powers such as the 
United States, Japan, and China. U.S. and Japanese cooperative initiatives have been 
continuously met with suspicion by Indonesia and Malaysia especially.48 Although this 
issue has hindered cooperation in the past, some experts accede that states in the region 
have begun to trust offers of assistance if couched less strongly, offering some hope for 
the future.49 
Despite the obstacles and limitations of cooperation in Southeast Asia, it is 
important to consider those factors that encouraged or facilitated cooperation. The first of 
these identified in the literature is the presence of a security threat sufficient to motivate 
cooperation between states in the region. Although slow in effecting change, the threats 
of maritime terrorism and maritime crime in the Malacca Straits ultimately provided 
states sufficient motivation to cooperate.50 John Bradford, in a 2005 article for the Naval 
War College Review, highlighted the realization by states in the region that maritime 
crime poses a direct because of the importance of maritime trade to their national 
security.51 In contrast, Victor Huang argues that despite the enthusiasm for countering 
maritime crime by states such as Singapore, the other states have yet to consider maritime 
crime “sufficiently compelling” to offset the political costs.52 Vivian Louis Forbes 
attributes the reduction of piracy in the region partly to national efforts, but largely to 
recognition by said states that maritime violence was a sufficient issue requiring 
                                                 
48 In a 2008 article, Victor Huang provides a thorough description of cooperative efforts for maritime 
security in the region, highlighting regional responses to U.S. and Japanese initiatives. In a 2004 article on 
Japanese anti-piracy initiatives, John Bradford details the unfavorable response to Japanese efforts to 
establish cooperative security regimes across Asia. Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: 
Outsiders Not Welcome?” 92–97; John F. Bradford, “Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: 
Policy Formation and the Coastal State Responses,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26:3 (December 2004), 
493–502. 
49 Bradford has consistently advocated a warming by regional states to regional cooperation and 
acceptance of extra-regional assistance. Huang agrees, stressing that states in the region are open to 
assistance, but on their terms. Bradford, “Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia,” 502–503; 
Bradford, “Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation Southeast Asia,” 73–75; Huang, 
“Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?” 98–99. 
50 Kraska, combating pirates; Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia,” 66–67; Rosenberg, 56; Vavro, 13. 
51 Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 67. 
52 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?” 96. 
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cooperation.53 Harry Harding, a noted Asian scholar and policy expert, disagrees, arguing 
that states in the region became increasingly aware of such “unconventional threats” 
following the Cold War, realizing that although they could address some issues alone, 
they would need to cooperate to deal with them all.54  
Another factor that has contributed to cooperation in Southeast Asia is the 
existence of a tradition of such activity, best illustrated by the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Formed in 1967, ASEAN’s goal was to develop regional 
strength by strengthening states in the region a goal described by Allan Collins as 
regional strength through strong states, not strong regional institutions.55 Collins 
describes this “holistic approach,” as one of mutual respect between members with 
resolution of disputes through peaceful means as the basis for progressive cooperation.56 
ASEAN was designed as a cooperative organization focused on “nation building,” 
designed to stabilize the region economically, socially, and culturally.57 Many scholars 
consider it to be a success, pointing to the relative stability of the region.58 
Amitav Acharya, in two books on security in Southeast Asia, accedes that 
ASEAN can be regarded as “one of the most successful experiments in regionalism in the 
developing world” but downplays its role in maintaining regional security.59 According 
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to Acharya, attempts at security cooperation in Southeast Asia were hindered by two 
familiar concerns: poor relations between member states and fear of external 
manipulation.60 In a similar work, Harry Harding further explains these concerns by 
highlighting the reluctance of Southeast Asian states to broaden regional security 
cooperation in the 1980s. According to Harding, many states were afraid that such 
arrangements would be dominated by a few states or would weaken their existing 
security capabilities or alliances.61  
Acknowledging the inability of the ASEAN states to cooperate on regional 
security issues, these same scholars still credit ASEAN with normalizing relations in the 
region. Acharya describes the organization as a vital part of the process of building a 
security community in which states “develop a reliable pattern of peaceful interaction, 
pursue shared interests, and strive for a common regional identity.”62 Collins echoes this 
observation, remarking that members of ASEAN appreciate that their individual security 
is tied to each other. He argues that ASEAN’s holistic approach at “nation building,” or 
maybe more appropriately, “nation strengthening,” has allowed increased cooperation 
across a wide range of issues.63  
E. THE MIDDLE EAST AND SECURITY COOPERATION 
Despite the consensus for regional cooperation that has recently become popular, 
some critics question the ability of states in the Middle East to cooperate within such an 
arrangement. In June 2009, Matthew Hulbert, a security analyst for the Center for 
Strategic Studies, argued that “greater coordination of counter-piracy measures…will 
become all the more critical in [the] future” but he stressed that the actors involved “lack 
the political cohesion…to shift the strategic landscape.”64 Even more, James Russell, a 
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scholar of Middle Eastern security issues, argues that states in the region have 
consistently “failed to see the value in cooperation as a tool to manage their security 
dilemmas,” with leaders often too distracted by their own issues, both internal and 
external, to realistically pursue cooperation.65 According to Jamal Al-Suwaidi, a noted 
Emirati scholar, despite the “lessons” provided by the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, security 
in the Middle East remains “volatile” and “the search for a more stable arrangement 
unsettled.”66 
The inability of states in the region to embrace the cooperative “spirit” of the 
post-Cold War era has been written on extensively over the past few decades. Most of 
this literature revolved around several key issues that remain constant to the present: the 
reality of continuous conflict in the region, the limiting nature of cooperation on national 
interests, the perception of force in regional relationships,67 and the reliance of states on 
the United States for protection.68 
A culture of conflict. First, continuous conflict in the region perpetuates national 
and regional instability. The near constant presence of conflict between states in the 
region has an obvious effect on attempts at cooperation. Many of the states remain 
suspicious of their neighbors, with shared borders a consistent point of contention, even 
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between cordial neighbors, and fueling animosity throughout the region.69 Even without 
the existing animosity and suspicion between states in the region, the weakness of 
leadership within Middle Eastern regimes and the subsequent reliance on their militaries 
for internal control, make it difficult for them to even consider external cooperation.70 
Internal stability remains a key concern of leaders within the region, perceptions that 
drive their reliance on internal and external security forces to maintain power. Regimes 
concerned with their own political survival, or with the perceived machinations of their 
neighbors, are naturally averse to arrangements that limit or dilute their power, politically 
or security-wise. 
Self-interests over regional security. A second related issue, cooperation, and the 
reciprocity necessary for its success, is seen by many regimes as a limit on their ability to 
respond forcefully to ensure their own interests. Geoffrey Kemp attributes this tendency 
to the maintenance of “zero-sum” perceptions within the region.71 According to Anthony 
Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, security in the Middle East over the past several 
decades can be better characterized as a result of national efforts, despite the presence of 
cooperative arrangements such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).72 To Cordesman 
and Al- Rodhan, the GCC is a “hollow” organization, as illustrated by the inability of its 
members to prevent conflict between them and the choice made by most of its members 
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to pursue their “own path” with regards to security.73 Another regional organization, the 
Arab League, although designed to foster cooperation across a wide-range of issues and a 
mechanism for conflict resolution between the Arab states, has also failed on most 
counts.74  
Force as a tool. Regional perceptions of deterrence and force are different from 
other regions.75 In the experience of most states in the region, the threat of or actual use 
of force is a rewarding and acceptable method of diplomacy. Military strength is 
considered an indicator of national strength and its use as a deterrent to aggression, 
naturally ensuring that force, versus cooperation, is the preferred tool of statecraft.76  
Reliance on external actors. The Middle East continues to be a region of concern 
for the world’s powers. The importance of the region’s chief export, oil, to the global 
economy makes security in the region an international issue. As described above, 
relationships between states in the region have been the large cause of conflict in the 
region, leading many of the weaker states to seek assistance from the United States and 
other external actors.77 The United States has willingly assumed the role of “protector” to 
these states in return for bases in the region, which, according to Cordesman and Al-
Rodhan, has had an unbalancing effect on regional security. The willingness of the U.S. 
to assume responsibility for regional security, they argue, has allowed states in the region 
to focus on internal issues while eschewing their external defense. With U.S. protection, 
Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait have had no incentive to cooperate regionally since all 
external threats are readily handled by the United States.78 
All of these factors present a daunting obstacle to cooperation in the region. 
Geoffrey Kemp argues, however, that “strategic, political and economic changes in the 
global environment have caused major realignments” that are pressuring states in the 
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region to seek normalized relations with their neighbors.79 The war in 1991 (and one can 
logically include the war in 2003) poignantly highlighted the inadequacies of Middle 
Eastern countries in an increasingly globalized world.80 
In response to these obstacles, Kemp and other scholars advocate a broader 
approach toward increased security cooperation in the region. In 1994, Kemp provided 
some requirements for successful security cooperation in the region. First, states in the 
region must develop a shared desire to promote and improve relations between them.81 
Second, they must work to reduce or eliminate security threats through compromise and 
diplomacy. Finally, he stresses the need for all of the states to “subscribe to the principle 
of “asymmetric reciprocity,” whereby participants reject the traditional “zero-sum” 
game.82 Bjorn Møller, a senior security researcher at the Danish Institute for International 
Studies agrees, adding that states in the region must develop a sense of mutual 
interdependence that provides them a “stake in maintaining peace.” He further advocates 
a more comprehensive approach, along the lines of ASEAN, which might meet with 
greater success, including dialogue concerning “threat misperceptions” that regional 
states might have, in an effort to diminish such misperceptions.83  
F. COOPERATIVE SECURITY THEORY  
The expressed importance of developing such relationships is not accidental, 
however. Cooperative security theorists have long discussed them and others as those 
necessary for effective attempts at cooperation between state actors. Literature on the 
broader topic of cooperative security identifies the first factor, development of a 
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normative base, as especially important to successful cooperation in a multilateral or 
regional environment. The noted political scientist and scholar, John Gerard Ruggie, 
argued in his 1993 book on multilateralism that cooperative arrangements depend on 
“certain principles of ordering relations” that “specify appropriate conduct for a class of 
actors.” More simply, participants in a cooperative endeavor must have a tradition of 
cooperation, rules (either spoken or unspoken) that govern the way they interact.84 In a 
separate work on cooperative security from the same period, Antonia and Abram Chayes 
affirm the need for a “strong normative base” within such arrangements. They stress that 
the success of a cooperative system “depends on the ability to generate, adapt, and 
enforce a system of governing norms.” So not only are norms important to establish but 
they must be flexible and enforceable. 85  
That leads to some important questions with direct application to this thesis, 
namely: what are norms and what characteristics does such a “normative base” possess? 
Again, John Ruggie’s book provides some useful insight on how actors within such an 
arrangement must act. In his introduction, Ruggie stresses that successful cooperation 
depends on “diffused reciprocity,” with “diffuse” meaning that an understanding exists 
between participants that the benefits of the arrangement will be evenly distributed over 
time. This is in contrast to more traditional agreements, such as those that existed prior to 
and during the Cold War, that narrowly define what benefits they will receive and 
when.86 Accordingly, the participants within a cooperative arrangement must be willing 
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Therefore, not only must participants establish a normalized framework for relations but 
they must also embrace the concept of diffuse reciprocity, or adopt a “win-win” 
mentality.88  
Adopting such an attitude, then, entails a level of trust between participants that is 
difficult between modern states. According to Emily Landau in her 2006 book on 
cooperative security in the Middle East, theorists agree that even in the “post modern” 
era, cooperation is still predicated on the concerns of a “self-interested state.” Therefore, 
theorists understood that they must focus on the “factors that encourage self-interested 
actors to adopt cooperative behavior.” This implies that states must have an incentive to 
enter into such cooperative arrangements. Incentives that, Landau argues, are difficult to 
provide since states are naturally reluctant to enter into an arrangement they perceive 
would provide greater immediate benefits to other participants Thus, she argues, 
cooperative efforts that do not address this reluctance are naturally difficult to maintain 
and short-lived. 89 
One way to mitigate such reluctance is to ensure that norms are enforced in some 
way, thereby assuring the participants that deviations from prescribed norms will be 
punished. According to Antonia and Abram Chayes, the states must have “confidence 
that the others…are abiding” by the same rules.90 Such expectations are difficult to 
realize, especially considering the nature of cooperative security theory, which insists on 
persuasion, versus aggression, as the means of dialogue and enforcement.91 Likewise, 
John Steinbruner argues that cooperative security systems, unlike previous security 
systems, which were characterized by active confrontation between military forces, entail 
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“active enforcement of collaborative rules,” relying on reassurance versus deterrence.92 
In her 1994 book on cooperative security, Janne Nolan, further specifies cooperative 
security arrangements as being “designed to ensure that organized aggression cannot 
start” through persuasion and dialogue.93 Accordingly, cooperative security arrangements 
depend on more peaceful means of dialogue, persuasion and reassurance specifically, to 
prevent conflict. This does not mean that conflict is obsolete. On the contrary, John 
Ruggie stresses that participants should expect disputes within the “limits of agreed upon 
norms and established procedures.”94  
Literature on the topic is especially clear with regards to what characteristics are 
essential for successful cooperative efforts. Participants must establish, or have 
established, a tradition of cooperation amongst them. This implies that they have a 
history of favorable group interactions and have successfully mitigated or minimized 
conflict over time. They are able to trust the other participants or the system sufficiently 
to allow them to forgo gains in the short term. They must also share a relative level of 
group cohesion and shared perceptions of threat sufficient to assure cooperation. In this 
sense, they must possess a unifying characteristic or sufficient threat to motivate them to 
seek cooperation.  
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Although not a perfect example of cooperative security, there is consensus that 
use of the Southeast Asia “model” provides a practical example of maritime security 
cooperation in a regional setting. Despite the shortcomings identified above, the 
Southeast Asian experience, namely the evolution of a cooperative tradition between 
states in the region, coincides closely with established theories of regional cooperative 
security. Establishing political willingness—specifically realizing the existence of a 
shared threat, identification of their own inability to address that threat, establishment of 
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trust between neighbors through confidence building, and the gradual formation of 
increasingly complex, cooperative arrangements—was necessary for states in the region 
to reach the present level of cooperation. It is useful, therefore, to utilize this “model” to 
better understand the feasibility of similar arrangements in the Middle East. 
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III. PIRACY AND MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Piracy has long been a problem in the Malacca Straits, one of the busiest maritime 
shipping lanes in the world. Piracy has long been considered a domestic nuisance best 
handled by local governments. During the late 1990s, however, a significant increase in 
reported criminal and pirate attacks in the Straits brought the issue to the attention of the 
international community.95 Regional actors faced increasing pressure by the international 
community to take action to curb piracy. Despite some early efforts to do so, regional 
states were often unable and unwilling to act. It was not until 2004, after it became 
obvious that efforts had been insufficient to counter the economic and political effects of 
maritime violence in the Straits, that these states began to take concerted action.  
These attempts took the shape of coordinated agreements, some operational in 
nature and others focused strictly on information sharing and administrative coordination. 
It is the overall effort that is widely credited by many for the recent reduction of maritime 
violence in the Straits of Malacca.96 As detailed in the previous chapter, this success, 
whether perceived or real, has been extensively cited as a template for cooperative action 
against pirates in the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean. 
This chapter provides context for further comparison of maritime security 
cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. It will first provide background on 
the steps taken by regional and extra-regional actors to counter piracy and the effect these 
steps have had on curbing the problem. It will end by summarizing the effect these steps 
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have had on maritime security cooperation in the region, overall. It will argue that 
repeated attempts at cooperation on regional maritime issues have followed an 
evolutionary trend, establishing a tradition of cooperation within the region. This 
tradition was facilitated by a mutual understanding of the threat piracy posed, the 
realization that unilateral action was insufficient to address it, and the rejection of 
dependence on external assistance.  
B. UNILATERAL EFFORTS AT REGIONAL COUNTER-PIRACY 
Despite the increased awareness of the piracy problem in the Malacca Straits, 
little action was taken, initially, to reverse the trend. Regional responses to international 
pressure were limited in nature with the primary countries, Indonesia and Malaysia in 
particular, hesitant to take concrete action to stem the rise in attacks. To this effect, these 
three countries’ attempts at unilateral action were ineffective, as reported attacks in the 
Straits dipped slightly in 2002 but remained high for two more years (See Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2.   Maritime Violence in the Malacca Straits (1998–2008)97 
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This second dip, observed near the end of 2004, was more likely the culmination 
of two key developments. The first of these was the realization by some of the regional 
actors that actions up to that point had proved ineffectual, a realization that led to greater 
unilateral actions. The second development consisted of greater regional cooperation, 
which will be discussed in a subsequent section. The primary cause of the ineffectiveness 
of these national efforts was the lack of maritime capacity, including a general lack of 
vessels to patrol the Straits and sufficient capability to conduct counter-piracy operations. 
In 2003 and 2004, the three countries—Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia—began to 
earnestly build their maritime capacity and integrate their maritime forces toward a more 
streamlined, focused force. The next three sections will briefly discuss the unilateral 
actions taken by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia to counter maritime violence in the 
Malacca Straits. 
1. Singapore 
Singapore’s waters are often considered the safest in the region, partly because it 
invested heavily in its maritime forces, but also because it has far less water to control.98 
More recently, Singapore has streamlined maritime security operations and decision 
making through the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF). The MSTF’s role is to 
coordinate the activities of the Singapore port authority, coast guard and navy. Singapore 
maritime forces, overall, are significantly smaller than its neighbors, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. This should have little overall effect, however, considering the area it must 
control, approximately 200 square nautical miles (NM).99 As of June 2009, the Singapore 
Navy consisted of approximately 4,500 personnel, 5 maritime patrol aircraft, 13 surface 
combatants, and 35 patrol vessels. The Police Coast Guard reportedly consists of 
approximately 1,000 personnel and over 100 patrol vessels.100  
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Singapore has actively advocated increased cooperation among regional actors. It 
has led in several attempts to increase situational awareness and information sharing 
through the formation of modern tracking and coordination centers. In fact, the 
International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre and ReCAAP’s Information 
Sharing Center (ISC) are both located in Singapore, signaling the state’s willingness to 
lead cooperative efforts in the region. In 2007, the Singapore Ministry of Defence, 
announced the establishment of a new joint command center, the Singapore Maritime 
Security Centre (SMSC), which would also house an Information Fusion Centre (IFC) 
and a Multinational Operations and Exercise Centre (MOEC). The goal of the SMSC, 
according to the Defence Minister, was to provide a “useful platform for nations to 
cooperate and respond more flexibly and effectively to a dynamic maritime security 
environment.''101  
 
Figure 3.   Total Maritime Inventory in Southeast Asia (2009)102 
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2. Malaysia 
Malaysia’s position in the region produces more significant challenges than those 
that Singapore faces. With over 2,500 NM of coastline, the sheer size of Malaysia’s 
territorial waters poses a significant challenge to its limited maritime forces. Up until 
2004, Malaysia did not possess the necessary ships and aircraft to unilaterally patrol the 
Straits or deter attacks against shipping, despite a sustained effort to build its capacity 
since 2000. The establishment of a dedicated anti-piracy task force within the Royal 
Malaysian Marine Police in 2000, which included the acquisition of 24 new patrol craft, 
was inadequate in addressing the shortfall. Soon after, Malaysian officials lamented that 
the Navy did not have adequate vessels to patrol their extensive territorial waters, 
regardless of promised aid by Indonesia.103 Professionalism has also been a problem for 
Malaysian authorities, with accusations of corruption, including extortion and piracy, 
common.104  
By 2004, Malaysia began to take concerted action to address its operational 
shortcomings, establishing the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). The 
MMEA brought together Malaysia’s five maritime agencies into one organization with 
the goal of streamlining maritime operations in its waters. Finally launched in 2005, the 
agency sought to increase capacity through the refurbishment of existing vessels and the 
purchase of new patrol craft and helicopters.105 As of 2009, the MMEA consisted of 
approximately 5,000 personnel and 60 patrol vessels dedicated to counter-maritime 
violence operations. The Malaysian Navy was significantly larger, reportedly consisting 
of 20,000 personnel and 50 surface combatants and patrol craft.106 
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Malaysia has made recent efforts to increase its maritime capabilities, gradually 
accepting foreign assistance and procurement. In 2007, with the assistance of the United 
States, Malaysia initiated upgrades to its coastal surveillance systems and related 
command centers, to be completed in 2009.107 
3. Indonesia 
With an even longer coastline than Malaysia, over 29,000 NM, Indonesia has had 
difficulty in adequately patrolling its waters. Indonesia did make efforts in 2003 to 
modernize its maritime forces and emphasized the role of these forces in combating 
maritime violence. These measures included the formation of regional control centers, 
with special counter-piracy units, to serve command and control functions.108 Like 
Malaysia, Indonesia established a combined maritime agency responsible for 
coordination among its six maritime agencies. The Indonesian Maritime Security 
Coordination Board (BAKORKAMLA) was institutionalized in 2005, and among other 
roles, is responsible for the coordination of maritime security activities and operations in 
Indonesian waters.109  
Despite efforts to streamline and coordinate their maritime capabilities, the 
Indonesian Navy has been unable to adequately address its material deficiencies. Efforts 
to increase the size of their fleet through both internal and external sources have been 
unable to adequately bolster the capacity.110 High-ranking navy officials publicly 
acknowledged their deficiencies in 2009, stating that they required another 262 patrol 
ships to adequately patrol Indonesian waters. As of September 2009, the Indonesian Navy 
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boasted approximately 57,000 personnel (16,000 of which were Marine forces), over 30 
surface combatants, and nearly 50 patrol craft. Compounding this shortage, only 25 
percent of their 115 vessels can be considered serviceable, placing additional doubt on 
Indonesia’s maritime capacity.111 The Indonesian government has also been willing to 
accept limited external assistance. It has worked closely with the United States, for 
example, to build its maritime capacity, with the United States providing equipment for 
five coastal surveillance radars in the Malacca Straits.112 
C. BILATERAL COOPERATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Most prohibitive to initial counter-piracy efforts in the region was the 
unwillingness of regional actors to actively participate in cooperative arrangements or 
accept foreign assistance. Such opposition was based on sentiments of national 
sovereignty characterized by two key attributes: mistrust of their neighbors and fear of 
foreign meddling. Many of the primary actors, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand, were sensitive to any infringement on national sovereignty by their neighbors, 
specifically control over their own territorial waters.  
Early attempts at cooperation among the regional actors highlight the inherent 
difficulty in building cooperative relationships. Following the colonial periods of the 19th 
and 20th centuries, the Southeast Asian states struggled to define themselves. National 
boundaries, whether ashore or at sea, were particularly vexing. At any given time, one or 
another state has been in conflict with another over the delineation of shared borders. 
Usually, this was precipitated by aspirations to control strategic islands or natural 
resources, disputes that became national priorities and sources of continued tension.113  
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This environment of underlying mistrust created serious impediments to 
cooperation between neighbors. With regards to maritime violence in the Straits, 
Malaysia and Indonesia viewed piracy as a domestic problem and stressed the importance 
of sovereign control over their territory, regardless of the Malacca Straits designation as 
an international waterway. Not surprisingly, when the regional states did begin to 
establish cooperative frameworks, they stressed the primacy of national rights, expressly 
prohibiting incursion into another nation’s waters, even in pursuit of criminals.114 
Mechanisms to prevent such incursions, even in cases where forces were in “hot pursuit” 
of suspected pirates or criminals, have been carefully maintained in almost every 
agreement of the past three decades. 
Despite their tendency to resist cooperation early on, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore were eventually able to take steps toward limited bilateral cooperation. Prior to 
the rise of maritime violence in the late 1990s, there had been efforts between the 
individual states to increase cooperation in the maritime environment. Malaysia and 
Indonesia had established formal agreements on maritime cooperation as early as 1980. 
Other bilateral agreements for coordinated patrols had existed between the three countries 
since 1992.115 In that year, Singapore and Indonesia signed a cooperative agreement that 
established a direct communication link between naval counterparts in each country. 
Later that year, both countries agreed to coordinated patrols in the Straits, an agreement 
highlighted by the understanding that these patrols would call for assistance when pursuit 
into the other’s territorial waters was likely. Likewise, Malaysia and Indonesia formed a 
joint Maritime Operation Planning team to coordinate patrols in the Straits of Malacca in 
1992 and conducted joint maritime exercises on the border the following year.116 Later in 
2003, Malaysia renewed a standing bilateral agreement with Thailand for coordinated 
maritime patrols in the northern Malacca Straits.117 The limited success of those 
endeavors is obvious considering the subsequent rise in maritime violence in the region, 
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but such agreements were invaluable in the long-term. In fact, any steps toward 
cooperation, even those limited in nature, can be seen as precursors to further cooperation 
since an integral part of any such arrangement is sustained confidence in the motives of 
the other partners.118 
D. THE ROLE OF EXTRA-REGIONAL ACTORS 
Just as suspicion between the states of the region had characterized their regional 
relationships, their reaction to offers of assistance by those outside the region hindered 
the success of maritime security efforts in the region. Following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, extra-regional actors, such as the United States and Japan, were 
eager to provide increased assistance for counter-terrorism efforts. United States and 
Japanese apprehension over what were considered substantial maritime vulnerabilities in 
the region motivated them to make forceful attempts at increasing coordination and 
cooperation in the region. Initial offers of foreign assistance were especially galling to 
Indonesia and Malaysia. These attempts provoked fear and suspicion among the regional 
states that external powers were attempting to gain power in the region at their expense. 
As a result, such “heavy handedness” was often rebuffed.  
1. Japan 
Japan had limited success in gaining consensus for maritime security cooperation 
in the region. As an extended member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN+3), Japan repeatedly proposed coordinated maritime patrols in the South China 
Sea and the Malacca Straits. First in 1997, it proposed the formation of a maritime 
security force with contributions from all the member nations. The Ocean Peace-Keeping 
(OPK) force was envisioned as a framework for maritime cooperation but was never 
embraced by the other members, especially China, who saw the proposal as an attempt to  
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reestablish Japanese dominance over the region. Similar efforts to establish a regional 
coast guard in 1999 were unsuccessful, and in the end, produced agreements of little 
consequence.119 
Japan enjoyed greater success when it focused on bilateral cooperation, however. 
Since the Cold War, Japan has conducted bilateral training exercises with most of the 
states in Southeast Asia, and Japan’s most successful attempts at fostering regional 
cooperation, ReCAAP, managed to promote discussion and limited information sharing, 
but have yet to convince critics of its effectiveness. 120   
2. The United States of America 
U.S. efforts to promote cooperative security were met with similar suspicion and 
often rejected outright. Overtures by the U.S. Pacific Commander to establish a Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in the Pacific were flatly rejected by Indonesia and 
Malaysia, both refusing to participate in the cooperative endeavor. Proposed in 2004, 
RMSI was designed to be a mechanism for maritime security cooperation and streamline 
counterterrorism efforts in the region. Intended to be completely neutral and voluntary, 
the initiative was doomed from the start, as unfavorable press led to misconceptions 
about its intent. Malaysia and Indonesia condemned RMSI as an attempt by the United 
States to control the sea-lanes of the region, an assault on their sovereignty.121 Since 
then, the U.S. has avoided attempts at multilateral cooperation in the region, instead 
focusing on strengthening existing bilateral relationships with the individual states. These 
relationships have primarily consisted of two interrelated efforts: capacity building and 
training. By focusing on these areas, the U.S. has managed to alleviate regional fears 
while contributing to the effectiveness of counter-piracy and counter-terrorism efforts in 
the region. 
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3. Regional Responses to Refocused International Assistance 
Extra-regional actors, like the United States and Japan, learned quickly from 
regional reactions to their initial attempts, initiatives that were perceived by the states as 
heavy-handed and intrusive. Subsequent measures proved more successful, primarily due 
to their less threatening, less imposing natures. In this respect, Singapore, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia made great strides toward accepting limited assistance from the United States, 
Japan, and other regional powers. Of the three, Singapore exhibited the greatest 
willingness to build cooperative relationships with such states. Heavily dependent on 
uninterrupted trade through the Straits of Malacca, Singapore has the most to lose if 
shipping is disrupted or diverted. Considering its reliance on maritime trade, Singapore 
was willing to cooperate extensively with international actors, including the U.S., Japan, 
and China, and accepted assistance in strengthening its maritime forces through training 
and technical assistance. Prior to 2000, Singapore was active in partnerships with several 
regional and extra-regional actors, including the United States, Japan, China, and as a 
member of ASEAN. 
Indonesia and Malaysia have shown an increasing willingness to cooperate with 
international actors, if only in a limited fashion. Indonesia and Malaysia have accepted 
assistance from the United States and Japan in strengthening their counter-piracy 
capacity, primarily through training and the purchase of patrol ships.122 Since the late 
1990s, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have all conducted bilateral naval exercises 
with the U.S., Australian, and Japanese navies. China has also recently increased its 
efforts at strengthening security cooperation in the region. Also of note is Indian 
involvement in the region. Coordinated patrols and bilateral naval exercises between 
India and most of the regional states have become routine and highlight India’s interest in 
expanding security cooperation to the peripheries of its historical area of operations.123  
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Although most of the above mentioned efforts have been bilateral and limited in 
nature, their success is evidenced by the increased willingness of the states in the region 
to accept aid and cooperate more extensively with extra-regional actors. Initial attempts 
at assistance were perceived as heavy-handed and often rejected outright. The previous 
examples highlight the experience of these extra-regional actors and the difficulties of 
attempting arrangements without considering the sensitivities of the regional actors. After 
considering these examples, it can easily be seen that properly couched attempts to foster 
cooperative arrangements, such as those that build on previous agreements and offer 
guarantees of respect to national sovereignty, tend to be more successful. Ironically, it is 
such early, insensitive attempts that were likely the catalysts for future multilateral action 
by regional actors, primarily because they forced the states in the region to seek courses 
of action that were more sensitive to each other’s suspicions and prevented “meddling” 
by those outside of the region. 
E. MULTILATERAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION  
By 2003, it was evident that the various unilateral and bilateral efforts to counter 
maritime violence in the region were insufficient for the task. From 2002 to 2004, 
reported attacks actually increased, with many attacks taking place inside territorial 
waters.124 Realization of this trend and sustained pressure from the international 
community led to several attempts at increased security cooperation in the maritime 
domain.  
1. Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols (MALSINDO) 
The first of these multilateral attempts, the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols, 
often referred to as MALSINDO, was designed to coordinate maritime efforts by 
deconflicting patrol schedules, streamlining information sharing, and facilitating cross- 
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border communication in the Straits.125 As a part of this agreement, Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia agreed to establish coordinated maritime patrols in the Malacca Straits in 
2004 in an effort to prevent and deter further attacks. Interestingly, MALSINDO was 
essentially an evolution of existing bilateral agreements between the three partners that 
expanded the scope of these original relationships. Thailand later joined the organization 
in 2005. Although viewed by some critics as merely a “sharing of schedules,”126 
MALSINDO arguably served as a step toward greater cooperation in the region. 
2. ReCAAP and the Information Sharing Centre (ISC) 
Another multilateral effort undertaken shortly after MALSINDO was the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
ships in Asia (ReCAAP). ReCAAP was a result of successive cooperative agreements 
including national, bilateral and multilateral efforts by and between the states of 
Southeast Asia to curb rampant piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits.127 Finalized 
by most members of ASEAN in 2004, the Japanese-led agreement established a network 
of regional centers providing information on attacks and partner actions to an Information 
Sharing Centre (ISC) centrally located in Singapore.128  
Heralded as the first successful multilateral agreement on maritime security 
cooperation in the region, its original members included Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, 
the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Myanmar, Norway, the 
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Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. By the end of 2006, nine more 
nations had joined ReCAAP. ReCAAP’s goals were to facilitate the sharing of 
information among members, collate and analyze data on maritime violence in the region, 
and support regional capacity-building efforts.129 Despite initial success at formalizing 
regional maritime cooperation and increasing support for capacity building, three 
inherent flaws limited its success: 130  
a. Non-Operational: The organization has no operational role and 
primarily serves as a framework for information sharing, essentially limiting the 
effectiveness of any effort since operational forces are required to physically deter and 
prevent attacks. 
b. Non-Binding and Non-Obligatory: ReCAAP’s non-obligatory 
nature, although vital to bringing regional actors together, makes it merely a “paper 
tiger,” with no authority to require sharing of information or coordination. 
c. Absence of Key States: Indonesia and Malaysia are not part of 
ReCAAP, limiting the scope and legitimacy of the organization. Their absence can be 
directly attributed to concerns regarding the agreement’s effect on national sovereignty. 
Ironically, these weaknesses can be considered to have been intentional, 
constituting an attempt to gain the most participation by couching the terms of the 
agreement in a non-threatening manner. Without operational commitments or other 
binding obligations, ReCAAP allowed members to participate at individual levels of 
comfort, in effect creating a framework for cooperation for cooperation’s sake. Despite 
these shortcomings, it is worthwhile to point out that ReCAAP did establish procedures 
for coordination and information sharing between states in the region through the use of 
regional centers and the Information Sharing Centre (ISC). 
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3. Joint Coordinating Council – MALSINDO Revamped 
Arguably, more recent multilateral efforts have been more effective, continuing 
the success of MALSINDO. The first of these was the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol 
(MSSP). MSSP essentially revised the original MALSINDO agreement and was designed 
to facilitate coordinated patrols in the Straits of Malacca. Made up of the three original 
member countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (with Thailand joining in 2008), 
MSSP was aimed at reducing maritime violence and smuggling in the Straits. The key to 
the success of this agreement was the limitation of naval patrols to their respective 
territorial water, thereby addressing fears of infringement on national sovereignty while 
increasing coordination between patrolling forces.131 
The second of these efforts was the Eye in the Sky (EiS) program. Started in 
2005, EiS consisted of coordinated air patrols of the Malacca Straits by maritime patrol 
aircraft from Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, in order to provide increased 
situational awareness of the maritime domain. EiS aircraft were allowed limited 
overflight of each other’s territorial waters, an ability provided by embarked Combined 
Maritime Patrol Teams (CMPT) that were made up of representatives from each member 
state.132  
These two programs were brought together, along with the newly formed 
Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG), under the Joint Coordinating Council (JCC) in 2006. 
The role of the JCC was to coordinate maritime and air patrols of the three member 
countries (and later a fourth with the joining of Thailand in 2008).133 The IEG consists of 
the intelligence agencies of the participating countries and is tasked to provide analytical 
support for MSSP and EIS missions. Sharing of this intelligence is accomplished through 
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the use of the Malacca Straits Patrol Information System (MSP-IS) and standardized by 
formal Information Sharing Procedures signed in 2009.134  
As a successor to MALSINDO, the JCC and its various parts were designed to 
build upon existing bilateral agreements and bolster its predecessor’s initial multilateral 
success. By increasing operational coordination, primarily through ensuring 
interoperability and formalizing intelligence sharing, the JCC was arguably more 
successful than ReCAAP and constituted a significant step towards greater security 
cooperation in the region.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Efforts to counter piracy and maritime violence in the Straits of Malacca have 
constituted a lengthy process. Initial efforts to counter the rising trend were hampered by 
two factors: insufficient maritime capacity and lack of political will. The first directly 
impacted the ability of individual states to address the increase adequately. Without 
properly trained personnel or adequate vessels and aircraft, the states that control the 
Straits were unable to effectively counter maritime violence in their own waters. Further 
hampered by the regional economic collapse of the late 1990s, these countries were 
unable to finance the necessary improvements and additions to their maritime forces.  
More important to the success of counter-piracy efforts was the role of bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements that enhanced maritime cooperation in the region. Such 
cooperative efforts were hindered more by lack of political motivation than by capacity. 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were initially reluctant to enter into cooperative 
agreements because of pre-existing mistrust and suspicion. The feared effect of such 
agreements on their national sovereignty caused concern and prevented early attempts at 
cooperation to counter maritime threats. Of particular concern was the continued sanctity 
of territorial waters. Indonesia and Malaysia were particularly sensitive to incursions by 
foreign forces into their waters, even in the case of “hot pursuit.” As a result, successful 
agreements over the past 30 years delineated the bounds of “hot pursuit” with regards to 
counter-piracy. This did not mean that cooperation was impossible. Several bilateral 
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relationships existed between individual states and between these states and extra-
regional actors during this period. These relationships were useful for building trust 
between the states and provided useful opportunities to increase maritime capacity.  
By 2003, the states in the region realized that greater action would be required, 
prompting attempts at increasing multilateral coordination. Because of these efforts, 
maritime violence in the Straits was on the decline by 2005. Reported attacks in that year 
dropped by over 60 percent from the year before and by half again in both 2007 and 
2008.135 This decline cannot be solely attributed to recent multilateral efforts, but more 
appropriately to an accumulation of effort at all levels: national, regional, and 
international.  
a.  National 
At the national level, regional actors took increasing steps to streamline 
coordination within their own services. As seen previously, Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia drastically restructured their maritime agencies to improve cross-
communication and increase counter-piracy efforts. In addition they all dedicated 
resources to increase their capacity through training and the acquisition of new 
equipment. 
b. Regional 
At the regional level, both bilaterally and multilaterally, they improved 
existing relationships with their neighbors, and established new relationships meant to 
strengthen the coordinated maritime effort. They increased coordination at the regional 
level and instituted cooperative frameworks that were acceptable to each partner.  
c. International 
States in the region slowly increased cooperation with extra-regional 
actors, focusing on limited assistance rather than integration. To do so, they accepted 
assistance in the form of financial aid, and increased training opportunities and 
equipment procurement programs. 
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By considering these factors, the success of maritime security cooperation 
in Southeast Asia can be seen as an evolutionary process progressing from one level to 
another, eventually leading to its present, multilateral form. By simultaneously 
addressing issues of capacity and political will at varying levels, states in the region were 
able to increase their maritime capabilities and build confidence in each other. Through 
trial and error, regional actors gradually gained confidence in the intentions of their 
neighbors and developed boundaries regarding their relationships with extra-regional 
actors. Likewise, regional political sensitivities and reduced capacity required regional 
and extra-regional actors to reconsider their efforts and decide upon new courses of 
action. Although some critics question the effectiveness of recent agreements due to their 
limited nature, some attributing it to the economic and social effects of the 2004 tsunami 
or the resolution of political conflict within the states themselves, there has been an 
obvious downward trend in attacks in the Straits of Malacca in the last few years. The 
success of these efforts, no matter how limited, does provide an opportunity to compare 
such measures to those being taken in the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean, and 
determine the applicability of the Southeast Asian model to the situation off Somalia. 
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IV. COUNTER-PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN AND WEST 
INDIAN OCEAN 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Although piracy in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and West Indian Ocean shares many 
of the key causal factors and characteristics of piracy in Southeast Asia, it is drastically 
different. Resulting efforts to address it have been equally disparate. This chapter will 
highlight the steps taken by the international community, regional states, and the various 
factions controlling Somalia to combat piracy’s dramatic rise. It will begin by focusing 
on the various efforts to combat Somali piracy by national, regional, and international 
interests. This analysis will examine the unilateral measures undertaken by the different 
factions presently controlling Somalia and the effectiveness of their efforts. It will 
include a description of the actions taken by Yemen, a country that has a crucial role to 
play in preventing maritime violence in the GOA.  
A description of international measures, multilateral, bilateral and unilateral in 
nature, will then be provided to illustrate the breadth of the counter-piracy effort in the 
region. Following this, the chapter will analyze the trans-regional and regional 
cooperative agreements that developed in response to piracy. In conclusion, it will 
provide analysis of the effectiveness of all these measures by examining the results of 
each and their effects on maritime security cooperation in the region. It will argue that 
besides the almost total absence of maritime security capacity in the region, specifically 
in the GOA, states in the region lack the internal and external mechanisms to address the 
issue of piracy. Distracted by more pressing internal issues, the states that border the 
GOA have insufficient “political will” to consider addressing it. 
B. UNILATERAL EFFORTS AT REGIONAL COUNTER-PIRACY 
Despite increasing international attention given to piracy in the region, national 
measures to counter the problem have been minimal. This is due primarily to the inability 
of key states in the region to exert control over the areas they claim. These states also 
happen to be the poorest in the region, lacking a formal economy, as in the case of 
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Somalia, or possessing relatively weak economies, as in Somaliland and Yemen. Without 
adequate financial resources or political legitimacy, these states have been unable to take 
effective action against piracy. The primary result of their financial and political woes has 
been the inability of these states, most obviously in Somalia but still evident in Yemen, to 
maintain sufficient security capacity on land, let alone at sea. As a result of these political 
and security weaknesses, pirates have been able to consolidate power and even expand 
their operations with little fear of retribution. It has been only recently that concrete 
action has begun to emerge in the region, as political developments within Somalia have 
started to rearrange the security outlook. This section will examine the capacity of these 
states to take action and provide a background on the actions they have taken, whether 
successful or unsuccessful.  
1. Somaliland 
Somaliland declared its autonomy from greater Somalia in 1991, shortly after the 
fall of the Barre regime. It currently functions as a separate state but lacks recognition by 
the international community, and thus is still considered, politically, to be part of the 
recognized Somali republic. Despite this, Somaliland has fared relatively well and is 
considered by many observers to possess a relatively stable government and security 
situation, the latter evidenced by the lack of piracy in its waters. However, further 
contribution to regional maritime security by Somaliland would be extremely difficult 
since the country receives little international assistance and has been forced to tackle the 
piracy problem using its existing, limited maritime capability.136 
The Somaliland Coast Guard reportedly has three small patrol craft left from the 
former regime and approximately 150 personnel.137 As late as May 2009, the Somaliland 
Coast Guard was actively pursuing pirates operating near their waters and despite the 
absence of specific piracy laws in its legal code, had convicted pirates to prison time.  
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Following these arrests, a Somaliland spokesman publicly stated that Somaliland was 
“committed to fight against pirates and terrorists,” but admitted that the state lacked the 
capacity to do so effectively.138 
2. Puntland 
Puntland has functioned as a semi-autonomous state since 1998, separate from the 
Somali Republic and the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG). Although not as politically and socially stable as its Somaliland neighbor, the 
Puntland government has provided relative peace and stability to the area it controls. 
Unfortunately, its government is notoriously corrupt with high-ranking tribal and 
government leaders rumored to have benefited from piracy, indirectly if not directly.139 
Although not backed by substantive evidence, these rumors seem to hold some truth. 
Throughout the dramatic rise in attacks from 2008 to 2009, pirate groups were operating 
extensively from Puntland, calling into question the effectiveness and honesty of 
Puntland authorities.  
Puntland’s political system is heavily influenced by clan dynamics. With three 
major clans and various sub-clans continuously vying for dominance in the region, 
Puntland’s government finds itself far more concerned with maintaining the balance of 
power through financial support of the various factions than countering piracy with an 
established maritime force.140  
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Considering this conflict of interests, it is not surprising that Puntland’s 
indigenous maritime capability is virtually nonexistent. Realizing this limitation, the 
government of Puntland made efforts in the late 1990s to outsource maritime security. 
Although not widely known, these efforts to privatize maritime security off the Puntland 
coast were significant as they illustrated the willingness of Puntland officials to invest 
money in countering maritime violence and illegal fishing. From 1999 to 2008, the 
Puntland government made repeated attempts to contract its maritime security out to 
private security firms.141 Whether due to legal concerns regarding Puntland’s authority to 
enter into such agreements or reported corruption by the contractors themselves, these 
efforts were unsuccessful. The failure of these attempts further highlight the problem of 
legitimacy the Puntland government faced and could be partly attributed to corruption 
within the government itself. 
Due to its lack of maritime capacity most of Puntland’s counter-piracy efforts 
have come on the land. In early 2000, the Puntland government dedicated some of its 
meager security forces to track down and arrest pirates operating within Puntland. Raids 
on known pirate havens were widely reported in the local press and provided local 
leaders opportunities to highlight the increased effort of Puntland forces.142 Publicly, 
Puntland officials condemned piracy and pledge to combat it within their borders.  
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However, Puntland authorities also realize that they lack the capacity to do so effectively 
and insist that international assistance through training and capacity building is 
necessary.143 
More recently, Puntland initiated cooperative relationships with international 
forces operating in the region. NATO officials interviewed in September 2009 announced 
that cooperative patrols with Puntland security forces had been established along the 
Puntland coast. These patrols consisted of NATO vessels and aircraft with embarked 
Puntland security representatives, who were shown suspected pirate camps. Subsequent 
patrols reportedly showed that many of these camps had disappeared.144 These initial 
efforts also included official meetings between NATO operational commanders and 
Puntland security officials.145 
The president of Puntland also met with EU representatives, in September 2009, 
to discuss increasing cooperation against piracy and human smuggling between the two 
entities. The two parties also discussed international assistance projects to address the 
economic and social issues in Puntland.146 
3. Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia 
The TFG acts as the internationally recognized government of Somalia and is 
based in Mogadishu. Although considered by the UN, and therefore most of the 
                                                 
143 “Somalia: 'American Warships Should Leave Somali Coast or Fight Pirates' – Puntland Govt,” 
Garoowe Online, March 16, 2008, 
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/American_warships _should_leave 
_Somalia_coast_or_fight_pirates_Puntland_govt_printer.shtml (accessed October 30, 2009). 
144 NATO officials heralded these initial cooperative steps with the local government as critical to 
effectively countering Somali piracy at its source, on land. These statements were made by Deputy Chief of 
Staff Operations, NATO Maritime Component Command Northwood, Commodore Hans Helseth 
(Norwegian Navy), at the Maritime Piracy Summit held in Vienna, Virginia, on 22–23 September 2009. 
145 NATO commander have met several times with Puntland authorities to share information and 
discuss further cooperation. See the NATO MCC Web site for further information and official press 
releases, “NATO works with Somali officials,” NATO Operation Ocean Shield Web site, August 14, 2009; 
“NATO meeting with Puntland Regional Administration,” NATO Operation Ocean Shield Web site, 
September 11, 2009; “NATO works with Somali authorities,” NATO Operation Ocean Shield Web site, 
September 24, 2009, 
http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_ocean_shield.aspx#NATO_works_with_Somali _authorities  
(all accessed October 30, 2009). 
146 “Somalia: Puntland Leader Receives EU Delegation in Galkayo,” Garoowe Online, September 1, 
2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200909020108.html  (accessed October 19, 2009). 
 52
international community, as the legitimate government of the country and subsequently 
the beneficiary of most international assistance, the TFG exerts little control over 
government and security in Somalia. The TFG has been in constant conflict with other 
factions within Somali political society since its inception in 2002. Military intervention 
by the Ethiopians in 2007 and the African Union in 2008, prevented collapse of the TFG 
by pushing back more dominant groups, primarily radical Islamist groups such as the 
Union of Islamic Courts and Al Shabaab. Without support from these regional actors, the 
TFG would likely have been completely pushed out of the region. 
Like Puntland, TFG security forces consist primarily of militia-like organizations 
with little formal training or coherent structure. Initially, little action was taken by the 
TFG to combat piracy, mostly due to the inability of the government to adequately police 
the few areas it did control. As with Puntland, these shortcomings were initially 
addressed by seeking assistance from private security firms.147 Also like Puntland, these 
efforts were unsuccessful and highlight the difficulties inherent in bilateral relations 
between the government and private companies.  
In response to international pressure, TFG officials announced the formation and 
training of a new Somali Navy in 2008, with assistance from the international 
community.148 The new maritime force reportedly consists of 500 personnel but no patrol 
craft, implying that the focus of the force will be to combat piracy on land rather than at 
sea. The legitimacy of this initiative, as well as the nascent Puntland effort, was 
strengthened tremendously in September 2009 with the announcement by the TFG that 
Puntland would be the home of the new Somali Navy. Additionally, Puntland was given 
the authority to enter into agreements with international actors on behalf of the Somali 
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government. Overall, the agreement was a significant step toward national reconciliation 
and provided a framework for successive attempts at cooperation.149 
4.  Yemen 
Although likely not directly involved with piracy, Yemen has still played a crucial 
role in the development and continuance of Somali piracy. The two countries share 
thousands of years of history, often depending on each other economically and socially. 
Trade between Yemen and Somalia has a tremendous effect on the economic and social 
situation of the population on both sides. Traditional trading partners, both countries have 
benefited from the flow of goods and people across the GOA for thousands of years. 
Somalis depend on the export of livestock through Yemen to the rest of the Middle East 
for their livelihood, trade that survived the collapse of the formal government in 1991. 
Besides the flow of legitimate trade, the nature of illicit trade better illustrates the social 
and economic relationship between the two countries. Yemen serves as the transit route 
for laborers seeking to find work in the Middle East, illustrated by reports of human 
smuggling between the two countries every day. Thousands of illegal immigrants are 
estimated to attempt the GOA crossing every year with the help of human smugglers and 
the tacit approval of corrupt Yemeni officials. Trade in qat, a mildly narcotic but 
extremely addictive plant, popular throughout the region but primarily grown in East 
Africa, also serves to connect the two countries.  
Yemen itself is considered by many of its neighbors and the international 
community to be a haven for extremists and rife with corruption. Saudi Arabia, a country 
with a long and spotted history with Yemen, began building a concrete barrier along its 
border with Yemen to prevent smuggling and incursions by extremists. Over the past 
several years, Saudi Arabia has blamed the government of Yemen for allowing extremists 
to use Yemen as a base for operations against the Saudi kingdom. In late 2009 in 
particular, Saudi military forces even conducted cross-border operations into northern 
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Yemen to prevent incursions into the kingdom, and initiated a naval blockade of the 
eastern Yemeni coast to prevent the flow of weapons to the extremists.150 
Relations with its neighbor across the GOA, Eritrea, are also strained. Yemen 
opposed Eritrean independence from Ethiopia and each country backed opposing factions 
in Somalia in the mid 2000s, with Eritrea backing the UIC and Yemen backing the 
TFG.151 
Although active along the coast, especially around the port city of Aden, Yemeni 
maritime forces have proven to be ineffectual in controlling their own waters. The overall 
material readiness, training, and capacity of these forces is considered to be minimal and 
there has been no observed growth in personnel or platforms in recent years, despite 
continued international support. Yemeni maritime forces consist of approximately 3,000 
personnel, split between navy, marines, and coast guard. The Yemeni Coast Guard 
consists of approximately 1,000 men and 40 patrol boats (four of which are coastal patrol 
craft). 152  The Yemeni Navy consists of approximately 1,700 sailors and 500 marines. Its 
fleet consists of a corvette, three aging, fast attack missile boats, and over 30 patrol craft, 
most of which are considered to be non-operational or in poor repair. The newest of these 
are 10 patrol boats acquired in 2003 from Australia. Additionally, there have been reports 
of the Yemeni government agreeing to purchase several Russian fast attack patrol boats 
in 2009, but these vessels have not yet been delivered.153 
Yemen has benefited greatly from international support. The United States, 
France, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Italy have all initiated bilateral programs  
 
 
                                                 
150 Al Jazeera, “Saudis 'to keep up Houthi campaign',” Al Jazeera.net, November 10, 2009, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/11/20091110141322184400.html (accessed November 
11, 2009). 
151 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Yemen,” Jane’s Information Group, last updated 
October 2008. 
152 Anthony H. Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars: Volume One  
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 526–530. 
153 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Yemen,” Jane’s Information Group, last updated 
October 2008. 
 55
aimed at building capacity, both maritime and ashore, and increasing capability through 
training and coordination. The following section will outline some of these initiatives in 
greater detail. 
Despite the assistance of the extra-regional actors, Yemeni forces have been 
unable to stem the flow of illicit trade and maritime violence in the Gulf of Aden. Human 
smuggling and the qat trade continue to be a problem. Piracy only serves to further 
highlight their inadequacies, as the number of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden rose 
exponentially in 2008. Not only did the number of attacks rise, but also most took place 
on the Yemeni side of the GOA, prompting further criticism from the international 
community. Whether as a response to the drastic rise or to increasing international 
pressure, the Yemeni government announced the formation of a 1,600-man, 16-vessel, 
counter-piracy task force in 2008, charged to “enhance the protection of ships and stop 
Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Bab Al Mandab Strait.”154 The effectiveness of 
this measure and the resulting forces it constitutes has yet to be determined. 
C. BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE GULF OF ADEN 
Cooperation between the affected countries has been nonexistent, a development 
that can be explained by considering the state of government control in the region. As 
discussed above, Somalia, and to lesser extent, Yemen, lack strong governments and 
security forces to provide political and social order. The failed state of Somalia, unable to 
control its own territory, is equally unable to operate outside its boundaries in an effective 
manner, lacking the political and diplomatic wherewithal to cooperate with external 
actors, even their own neighbors. Only recently have some of the actors within Somalia 
begun to move toward measures that allow for bilateral relationships outside the country. 
The development of cooperative arrangements between NATO and the governments of 
Somalia, both Puntland and the TFG, began in 2009, after political compromises between 
the two groups provided political and diplomatic space for such action. This allowed for 
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coordinated patrols between international naval forces and Puntland security forces and 
led to the establishment of a Somali Navy based in Puntland.  
Yemen has exhibited the capacity to work bilaterally but lacks the resources and 
will to capitalize on these opportunities. Bilaterally, Yemen has been the most active state 
in the region. Yemen retains a close, if reluctant, relationship with the United States, a 
country that has made the small Arab state a priority in its counter-terrorism effort. Since 
the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and the terrorist attacks in 2001, the U.S. has 
dedicated millions of dollars to improve the capability of Yemen security forces both on 
land and at sea. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard maintain close relations with their 
Yemeni counterparts, conducting joint training exercises and maritime patrols with 
Yemeni maritime forces in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, Combined Joint Task Force – 
Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the U.S. task forces concerned primarily with security in 
the Horn of Africa, assisted Yemen in establishing a dedicated CT unit and helped 
strengthen security along the coast.155 Even through 2009, when the overall 
ineffectiveness of Yemeni counter-piracy efforts was most evident, U.S. officials 
maintained that Yemen continued to be a key actor in preventing pirate attacks in the 
GOA.156 
Other international actors have attempted to bolster Yemeni maritime capacity. 
Australia reportedly sold ten fast patrol boats to Yemen in 2003, vessels reportedly 
delivered to the navy in 2005. In 2005, Yemen and France signed a formal agreement to 
train and equip Yemeni forces dedicated to patrolling the Bab Al Mandab, the strategic 
waterway connecting the Red Sea and GOA, an agreement that included installation of a 
surface search radar system along the Yemeni coast.157 Similarly, in 2007, Yemen signed 
a contract with an Italian firm to install a series of “radar and electro-optical sensor 
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surveillance” sites and operations centers along the coast in an effort to enhance its ability 
to monitor maritime activity in its waters.158 
Other states in the region are better positioned to cooperate with regional and 
extra-regional actors, but often fail to do so whether it is because of a lack of resources 
and capacity or political willingness to confront an issue that does not directly threaten 
their interests. Bilateral measures in these cases have been limited to agreements based on 
legal issues or limited maritime capacity building and coordination. Despite the limited 
nature of these agreements, their contribution to the counter-piracy mission in the region 
is evidenced by greater coordination and increased training support. As previously 
mentioned, Kenya has signed Memorandums of Understanding with extra-regional actors 
conducting counter-piracy operations in the region. These MOUs have served to 
legitimize these efforts by providing a venue for legal proceedings against captured 
pirates. Other East African nations have begun to join in the effort. In 2009, the 
Seychelles signed separate cooperative agreements with the United States, France, and 
the European Union allowing for coordinated naval operations between the actors.159  
D. INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS AT REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY 
Although far more robust and ambitious than the actions of the individual states 
and interests in the region, the international response to Somali piracy has produced little 
quantifiable success. Despite the dedication of dozens of warships to the region in 2008-
2009, reported attacks in the GOA and West Indian Ocean actually increased through the 
first six months of 2009 (See Table 2). Successes initially attributed to the increased 
naval presence were later more appropriately attributed to changes in weather off the 
coast, as high seas and winds during the stormy seasons prevent most small craft activity 
off the eastern coast of Somalia. Conversely, the GOA is relatively protected during these 
periods, allowing for continued pirate activity throughout the year. 
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These initial failures were understandable considering the extent of the problem 
they were facing. With over 1,700 nautical miles of Somali coastline and 25 million 
square miles of ocean to patrol, even hundreds of vessels would have difficulty 
preventing pirate attacks.160 In contrast, by early 2009, there were only a few dozen 
warships in the region, all facing the daunting task of being everywhere at once. 
There have been some successes, however. Some attempts at bilateral cooperation 
between states in the region and the international task forces patrolling the seas were 
successful. Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) between the international actors and 
regional states regarding prosecution and imprisonment of captured pirates illustrate such 
successes. Such MOUs provide legitimacy to the counter-piracy efforts of the EU, 
NATO, and U.S.-led forces by allowing for captured pirates to be tried and punished for 
piracy according to international law. More recently, attempts at bilateral cooperation 
between NATO and the Puntland government facilitate information sharing and allow for 
greater coordination between counter-piracy forces at sea and on land. 
The following section will delineate the international response to Somali piracy, 
identifying the success or failure of these measures and describing the effect of each on 
maritime security cooperation in the region. 
1. European Union Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) 
The European Union authorized deployment of a dedicated, counter-piracy task 
force to the GOA in November 2008. The political agreement called for voluntary 
allocation of naval forces from EU member states to conduct military operations against 
“acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.”161 Designated “Operation 
Atalanta,” this task force deployed to the region by December 2008 and initially 
consisted of approximately six naval warships and support vessels. Besides its overall 
counter-piracy mission, the EU task force is specifically mandated to escort UN World  
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Food Programme (WFP) vessels transporting WFP shipments into Somalia. Operation 
Atalanta was originally mandated to continue for one year but was extended until 
December 2010 in June 2009.162  
EU NAVFOR Somalia primarily operates in the GOA and maintains the 
Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC); a designated transit route patrolled 
by EU vessels and coordinated by the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa), 
MSCHOA. MSCHOA coordinates maritime traffic through the region and facilitates 
operations with the other task forces in the region using the MSC HOA Web portal.163 
2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
NATO commenced its counter-piracy mission off Somalia, Operation Ocean 
Shield, in August 2009. NATO commanders consider Operation Ocean Shield to be a 
continuation of previous NATO counter-piracy efforts in the region. The official goals of 
the task force are to:164  
 Deter, disrupt and protect against attacks 
 Actively seek and prevent further pirate activity 
 Support development of regional maritime capacity 
 Coordinate NATO operations with other maritime forces conducting 
counter-piracy operations in the region 
Operation Ocean Shield is usually comprised of five to six NATO warships 
operating in the GOA and West Indian Ocean. Like EU NAVFOR Somalia, NATO 
disseminates information and facilitates coordination with the shipping industry and other 
task forces through a dedicated web portal, the NATO Shipping Center (NSC). As 
mentioned previously, in 2009 NATO commenced bilateral liaisons with the Puntland 
government to coordinate counter-piracy operations. 
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3. U.S. Responses and Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) 
The U.S. Navy has been active off Somalia since 2005, whether monitoring the 
location of hijacked vessels anchored off the Somali coast or actively tracking and 
interdicting pirate skiffs or mother ships operating in the West Indian Ocean. Initially, 
particularly from 2005 to 2007, U.S. Fifth Fleet only dedicated a few warships at a time 
to conduct counter-piracy operations in the region. This limited response can be 
attributed to the low-profile nature of piracy at the time and the limited availability of 
coalition warships available for dedicated counter-piracy operations.  
The dramatic rise of attacks in 2008 combined with the high-profile nature of 
some of these prompted a shift in U.S. policy. As attacks in the GOA and Indian Ocean 
become more high profile, the international media, and in turn, the general public, 
became more aware of the issue and international pressure for intervention began to 
grow. Of special importance were several events that illustrated the expansion of the 
pirate’s range and targeting: the hijacking of Le Ponant, a French luxury yacht; the Faina, 
a vessel loaded with Russian tanks; the Sirius Star, a Saudi supertanker carrying oil to the 
U.S.; and the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama, a Danish cargo vessel with an American 
crew.165 Unlike previous events, these attacks received extensive media coverage 
worldwide and subsequently initiated public dialogue on the issue.  
The U.S. shifted forces to the region as a result of the public outcry, initially 
drawing from its counter-narcotics task force, CTF-150, to counter piracy off Somalia. 
This multinational task force consisted of several warships from the U.S., international 
and regional partners such as Pakistan, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia. In August 2008, Fifth Fleet also established the Maritime Security Patrol 
Area (MSPA) in the GOA in an effort to coordinate counter-piracy efforts. Unfortunately, 
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piracy continued to rise through the end of 2008 into 2009, despite Fifth Fleet's increased 
efforts and the simultaneous arrival of the EU and NATO task forces. In response to this 
failure, in January 2009, U.S. Fifth Fleet established a dedicated counter-piracy task 
force, CTF-151, to allow for simultaneous counter-piracy and counter-narcotic efforts in 
the region.166 
CTF-151 is nearly identical in structure and composition to CTF 150, consisting 
of several coalition warships and support vessels. The initial task force deployed in early 
2009 was comprised of six warships, U.S., British, Dutch, and Turkish in nationality. 
Over 20 other nations promised to provide warships for the task force.167 Since its 
inception, CTF-151 has operated primarily off the eastern Somali coast. Despite the 
formation of this dedicated task force and its subsequent success at capturing some 
pirates, piracy off the coast still continues primarily because of the previously mentioned 
problem of having too few ships to patrol such a large area. 
4. United Nation Contact Group on Piracy off Somalia (CGPCS) 
The CGPCS was established in January 2009 as a result of UNSCR 1851, in an 
effort to “facilitate discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations 
to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia.”168 Since inception, the CGPCS has 
primarily served as a forum for international cooperation; to provide an opportunity for 
the international community to discuss increased naval coordination, promote 
preventative efforts within the maritime industry, facilitate legal solutions pertaining to 
captured pirates and increase the maritime capacity in the region. As of September 2009, 
45 nations had participated in the CGPCS.169 
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The CGPCS is basically a diplomatic mechanism to increase awareness on the 
issues surrounding piracy off Somalia and provides opportunities for the international 
community to address these issues at a state-to-state level. However, due to its status as 
merely a forum for discussion, it lacks the political authority and legitimacy to bring 
about tangible measures toward regional coordination. 
5. Other International Actions 
Other international actors began to take action in 2008. Individual states began to 
deploy naval forces to the region in answer to UN calls for action. The first of these was 
the deployment of a Russian warship in September 2008.170 This vessel was soon 
followed by ones from China, India, and Iran, all countries that had rarely made such 
gestures before.171 All of these deployments continued and grew in size through 2009. 
Deployment of these forces serves to highlight the international response to what was 
previously considered a regional issue, best handled by those directly affected by the 
phenomenon. 
E. TRANSREGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION  
By 2003, it was evident that the various unilateral and bilateral efforts to counter 
maritime violence in the region were insufficient for the task. From 2002 to 2004, 
reported attacks actually increased, with many attacks taking place inside territorial 
waters.172 Realization of this trend and sustained pressure from the international 
community led to attempts at increased security cooperation in the maritime domain. For 
example, regional actors from across the Middle East and Northeast Africa met in 
Djibouti to discuss piracy off Somalia, including how best to counter the phenomenon 
through coordination and cooperation. 
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In January 2009, eight East African states, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, the Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and one Middle Eastern 
state, Yemen, signed the Djibouti Code of Conduct, an agreement designed to improve 
coordination of counter-piracy efforts in the GOA and East Indian Ocean. Led by the UN 
under the auspices of the IMO, the Code of Conduct affirmed the signatories’ 
commitment toward increasing regional cooperation against piracy, actively interdicting 
suspected pirate vessels, ensuring legitimate legal action is taken against captured pirates, 
and that captured pirates and victims are treated fairly and with due diligence. In order to 
facilitate effective information sharing, the Code called for the establishment of three 
regional information centers in Yemen, Tanzania, and Kenya. 
In response to the signing of the agreement, the IMO Secretary General applauded 
the efforts of the signatories, highlighting the agreement’s similarities to the ReCAAP 
agreement in Southeast Asia, considering it a “starting point for successful cooperation 
and coordination in the region.”173 In fact, the Djibouti Code was based primarily on the 
ReCAAP agreement, another IMO-led endeavor. Like ReCAAP, the Djibouti Code 
serves as a basis for cooperation, but provides little authority or obligations to comply 
with its tenets. 
F. MULTI-LATERAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE 
REGION 
Regional attempts at multi-lateral cooperation have been equally slow-moving 
and half-hearted. As will be further discussed in Chapter IV, regional security 
cooperation does not have an impressive track record, consistently lacking the force that 
other attempts at cooperation such as the economy and identity protection elicit. 
In June 2009, several Middle Eastern Arab states met to discuss a proposed Arab 
counter-piracy task force. Representatives from Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen 
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attended the meeting. Participants stressed their concerns regarding piracy in the region 
and its affects on maritime shipping. Saudi Arabia agreed to lead coordination efforts 
between the Arab participants and other international naval forces operating in the 
region.174 
Later, in October 2009, naval representatives from the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) along with other Arab countries on the Red Sea decided to form a joint naval task 
force “aimed at combating piracy and guaranteeing…safety…” in the Red Sea. A Saudi 
representative affirmed that the mission of the task force was to prevent the spread of 
piracy outside of the Gulf of Aden and coordinate more effectively with international 
naval forces operating in the region.175 
These announcements were followed by little concrete action. As of November 
2009 there had been no measurable movement toward a cooperative security framework 
between the Arab states in the region. It is possible, however, to compare these initial 
steps, those promised during the Djibouti Code of Conduct and Arab Task Force 
meetings, to those of the nascent ReCAAP and MALSINDO members in the early 2000s, 
where public statements and formal agreements were ultimately succeeded by concrete 
efforts toward maritime cooperation and coordination. However, it may be too soon to 
tell if the Arab task force will enjoy the level of success its Southeast Asian counterpart 
has attained. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As described in this chapter, Somali piracy has garnered tremendous attention 
since 2008. The dramatic rise in pirate attacks and the pirates’ focus on larger, more 
valuable targets brought an old problem to the attention of the international community. 
As in other regions plagued by maritime violence and piracy, the waters surrounding 
Somalia provide ample opportunities for such attacks and lack strong national 
governments able to fully control the seas. These similarities provide observers with 
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obvious corollaries when it comes to solutions for piracy, as well. The most obvious of 
these was discussed in the previous chapter: counter-piracy efforts in Southeast Asia.  
The ineffectiveness of recent counter-piracy efforts in the GOA further enhanced 
the scrutiny of experts searching for an effective solution. International steps, including 
the deployment of dozens of naval warships from the international community, have 
proved largely ineffective, especially considering the continued rise in attacks following 
their arrival. EU, NATO, and U.S.-led task forces failed to reduce the number of attacks. 
National unilateral efforts have also proved ineffectual, hampered even more by a 
lack of political cohesion and capacity than the Malacca Straits countries. Somalia is 
considered a failed state with existing ruling groups unable to prevent piracy. Puntland 
and the TFG both lack the political legitimacy and security capacity to effectively prevent 
maritime violence originating from the areas they control. Yemen rivals its neighbor’s 
lack of control, proving repeatedly that it is unable to prevent illicit traffic, let alone 
heavily armed pirates, off its shores.  
Therefore, as in Southeast Asia, counter-piracy in the region is hampered by two 
key limitations: lack of political will and maritime security capacity. As has been 
illustrated by the cases of the various regions of Somalia and its neighbor, Yemen, lack of 
political will in their cases can better be understood as a lack of political effectiveness 
and highlighted by an inability to effectively control its territory ashore. Their maritime 
capacities are equally ineffective, further exacerbating their lack of control and making 
them unable to prevent pirates from using their waters to launch attacks. Considering 
their ineffectiveness, it is understandable that the international community would seek 
solutions that bypass or mitigate the weaknesses of these states. 
While the general metrics described above make Somalia and its neighbors’ case 
similar to Southeast Asia, it is the development of regional cooperative frameworks that 
sets them apart. Regional cooperation in MENA, unlike Southeast Asia, has been almost 
nonexistent, with most efforts seen as token gestures rather than sincere attempts at 
cooperation. The most publicized of these is the Djibouti Code of Conduct agreement, 
signed by several states in the region, and considered to be the first step toward a regional 
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cooperative framework like ReCAAP. More recently, some of the Arab states agreed to 
form an Arab counter-piracy task force to protect their interests in the Red Sea and Gulf 
of Aden. Both of these measures are laudable attempts at building confidence and 
consensus. However, they merely highlight their ineffectiveness by providing an 
opportunity to make half-hearted commitments that are not intended or able to be 
fulfilled due to a lack of political will and maritime capacity. 
International efforts aimed at preventing attacks at sea have been equally 
ineffective, as can be seen by the continued rise in attacks through 2009. It can be argued 
that any successes at preventing or deterring attacks can best be attributed to maritime 
industry measures rather than naval warships patrolling the waters off Somalia. Granted 
their presence is a deterrent, but as they have shown before, Somali pirates can quickly 
adapt to new situations. 
The most effective measures have been those taken by international forces to 
support and cooperate with the various interest groups within Somalia, specifically the 
semiautonomous government of Puntland and the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG), and with Yemen. These measures, consisting of support for increased maritime 
capacity and greater cooperation between counter-piracy forces, address the concerns of 
some that international patrols alone cannot prevent piracy, that states in the region must 
take action to counter piracy. Somalia and Yemen, however, have an excuse for 
depending on external assistance. They lack the internal and external stability necessary 
to facilitate both unilateral and cooperative maritime security efforts, an excuse their Gulf 
neighbors do not have. 
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V. THE MIDDLE EAST AND MARITIME SECURITY 
COOPERATION 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide an overview of security issues within the Middle East 
and include a background on maritime capacity and a summary of factors related to 
security cooperation between states in the region. It will first outline the maritime 
capacity of the remaining states in the region. By focusing on the states of the Persian 
Gulf, specifically Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and 
Qatar, it will illustrate the relative capabilities and condition of their maritime forces. 
This will include discussion of their primary roles, numbers of platforms and personnel, 
material condition of their vessels, training and capability of their personnel, and the 
relative mission proficiency of their forces. The second section of this chapter will 
discuss the factors that affect cooperation in the region, such as internal stability, external 
friction, and foreign dependence. The final section will quickly examine how these 
factors have affected security cooperation in the region using the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) as an example. 
B. MARITIME CAPACITY IN THE GULF 
Maritime capacity in the region can be best described by dividing the Gulf states 
into two distinct groups: regional powers and small regional actors. Those in the first 
group, Iran and Saudi Arabia, possess large populations and enjoy steady streams of 
income from petroleum and natural gas exports, allowing them to maintain much larger 
standing militaries than their smaller neighbors. Those in the second group are 
significantly smaller, enjoy varying levels of income from oil and gas, and depend more 
heavily on external protection. As can be expected, the regional powers are able to 
allocate more resources, financially and in terms of manpower, to building and 
maintaining their maritime forces (See Figure 4). Equally predictable is the inability of 
many of the smaller states to adequately man, equip, and train their own forces due to  
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financial constraints or relatively low populations. Some of the smaller states, such as 
UAE and Oman, have built modern maritime forces but lack sufficient manpower 
resources from which to draw personnel.  
 
Figure 4.   Total Maritime Inventory of the Gulf States (2009)176 
Issues of priority also affect maritime capacity in the region. As will be discussed 
in more depth in the subsequent section, external security has often been superseded by 
internal stability when regimes consider allocation of resources. This has been further 
exacerbated by the tendency of states in the region to rely on external security assistance 
and assurances for their external security needs. By allowing outside interests, primarily 
the United States in this case, to bear the burden of regional security, states in the region 
have been free to focus their attention and resources on building their internal security 
forces and bolstering internal mechanisms of control. The nature of maritime capacity in 
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the Gulf, especially, is significantly affected by their choice to rely on external protection 
and focus on maintaining their internal power base. The following sections will provide 
further background on the capabilities and limitations of each state. 
1. Regional Powers 
a. Iran 
Iran depends on its maritime forces to protect the vital interests of the 
state. For this reason, modernization of the Iranian Navy and its irregular “partner,” the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval Forces, has been a priority for the regime over 
the past few decades.177 This attention has allowed the service to enjoy an advantage 
over its counterparts in the region (See Figure 4). Its maritime capacity has increased 
significantly over the past few decades, both in capabilities and platforms. The Iranian 
Navy (IRIN) has 18,000 personnel (including approximately 2,600 marines and 2,600 in 
naval aviation), six large surface vessels (four frigates and two corvettes), almost 150 
coastal patrol craft of varying sizes, 13 amphibious ships, and 26 logistic/supply ships. It 
also has passable maritime patrol capability with approximately 11 fixed wing patrol 
aircraft, including three aging P-3 Orion's, and over 27 rotary wing aircraft of various 
models.178 Unlike the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Naval Forces (IRGCN), 
which will be further described later, the IRIN serves as Iran’s “regular” naval force, 
under control of the civilian government, with the mission of protecting the Iranian coast, 
especially its ports and vital petroleum infrastructure.179 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Naval Forces (IRGCN) is a 
separate maritime force from the regular navy. The primary mission of IRGCN is defense 
of the Iranian coast and its waters. It controls coastal defense batteries all along the coast, 
especially in the Strait of Hormuz (SOH), the only sea-lane into the Gulf. It also has an 
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important irregular warfare function and trains to conduct guerrilla-type missions, such as 
covertly laying mines and attacking maritime traffic off the coast.180 As its name 
indicates, the IRGCN is closely associated with the theocratic leadership of the Iranian 
government, serving as protector of the “revolution” within Iran. The IRGCN consists of 
20,000 personnel, including approximately 5,000 marines. It has an extensive surface 
fleet, fielding over 140 coastal patrol craft of varying size and capability.181 Other 
maritime forces can be drawn from Iranian border and security forces numbering between 
40,000 and 60,000 personnel, with approximately 130 small patrol craft.182  
Operationally, Iranian maritime forces tend to remain within or near 
Iranian waters due to their limited expeditionary capabilities and the nature of their 
defensive mission. With the exception of submarine exercises conducted regularly in the 
deeper waters of the Gulf of Oman, Iranian maritime forces conduct regular deployments 
within the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman, staying relatively close to 
land for limited periods of time.183 Recent exceptions to this tendency can be seen in 
Iranian efforts to contribute to counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden (GOA). In May 
2009, two Iranian naval vessels were dispatched to conduct anti-piracy patrols and escort 
Iranian merchant vessels in the GOA. These patrols have continued through early 2010 
and have reportedly remained independent from other forces operating in the GOA.184  
b. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia occupies a strategic position between the Red Sea and the 
Persian Gulf, which allows it unique control of the approaches to the region’s three vital 
waterways: the Suez Canal, the Bab-al-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. Also, as the 
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predominant military force on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia provides a 
counterpoint to the Islamic Republic of Iran, in effect shielding the smaller Gulf states 
from Iran’s influence and potential aggression.185 Its navy is the second largest in the 
region, behind Iran, with approximately 15,500 personnel and 44 surface vessels.186 Its 
surface fleet consists of 11 large surface combatants, approximately 65 coastal patrol 
craft, and five support vessels.187 The Saudi Navy has a substantial naval rotary wing 
force of approximately 44 attack and support helicopters but lacks a fixed wing maritime 
patrol force.188 The Saudi Navy’s primary roles are protection of the Saudi coast and 
maintenance of free navigation through the SOH, the latter role putting it into direct 
opposition with Iran.189  
The Saudi Navy has a relatively modernized force, having made great 
strides over the last decade in procuring new platforms and equipment. Its three newest 
surface combatants, Al-Riyadh class frigates, are modified French Lafayette warships, a 
sophisticated and effective design. However, these efforts at increasing its effectiveness 
have been hampered by poor training and readiness.190 Although considered “blue-water 
capable” by some, the Saudi navy has not shown a desire to utilize its forces in a “power 
projection” role. It does operate as a “two-sea force” with forces operating independently 
in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.191 The Saudi navy, specifically the Gulf “fleet,” has 
made “significant progress” recently, according to some experts, although these experts 
point to the Red Sea “fleet” as a “work in progress.”192 
Of note is the maritime contingent of the Saudi Border Guard, which 
functions under the Ministry of the Interior. The Border Guard is comprised of 
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approximately 30,000 men, although it is difficult to determine how many function in a 
maritime role. Its fleet includes over 60 patrol craft of various sizes and capabilities. The 
Border Guard is tasked with protecting key infrastructure along the coast, including 
plants, ports, and oil facilities.193 
2. Small Regional Actors 
a. United Arab Emirates 
Situated on the southeastern side of the Persian Gulf, the United Arab 
Emirates are naturally juxtaposed to Iran, both physically and politically. UAE has 
longstanding disputes with Iran over key islands in the Strait of Hormuz, which influence 
its relations with the country. It also has “close military ties” with the United States and 
Great Britain and offered assistance during the buildup to the Iraq war, despite the 
personal misgivings of UAE leadership.194 
The UAE Navy is small but modernized and well trained. Presently 
designed for coastal defense, it consists of 2,400 personnel, two frigates, two corvettes, 
eight fast patrol craft, 26 small patrol craft, 28 amphibious landing craft, and no dedicated 
support vessels. Its aviation wing consists of 14 maritime attack and four maritime 
surveillance helicopters,195 providing it a substantial over-the-horizon capability most of 
its peers lack. The UAE Border and Coast Guard directorate is part of the UAE armed 
forces and consists of approximately 10,000 personnel, although not all of these are 
maritime related, and over 128 patrol craft of various sizes and capabilities. The role of 
the coast guard is to prevent smuggling and illegal immigration along the coast.196  
Although historically a largely coastal force, the navy has begun to expand 
its role to include blue-water capability, envisioning its forces able to “conduct and 
sustain operations throughout the Gulf region, the Arabian Ocean, and as far as the Red 
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Sea and the Indian Ocean.”197 The navy has begun to modernize and expand its fleet 
accordingly by increasing acquisition through foreign procurement and domestic 
shipbuilding.198 This expansion has been hindered, however, by manpower shortages, a 
problem within the military as a whole. The resulting reliance on foreign expertise and 
manning reduces the overall effectiveness of an otherwise capable force, according to 
critics.199 As a whole, the UAE Navy is more formidable than those of the smaller Gulf 
countries but smaller than those of Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
b. Bahrain 
Bahrain is a small, yet strategically located country. It is situated on the 
western side of the Persian Gulf between some of the regions key offshore oilfields. 
Bahrain lacks the natural resources of its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
depending on regional trade and finance to drive its economy. Because of this, the 
primary function of the Bahraini maritime forces, its navy and coast guard,200 is defense 
of the sea-lines of communication and protection of the country’s maritime boundaries 
against piracy, illegal smuggling, and illegal fishing.201 
The Royal Bahraini Navy is small compared to those of Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, but closely matches the forces of its regional peers (see Figure 4). As of June 2009, 
it consisted of approximately 1,000 sailors, three surface combatants (one frigate and two 
corvettes), eight fast patrol craft, five amphibious ships and one support vessel.202 Unlike 
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its neighbors, the Bahraini fleet is in good material condition and considered “fully 
combat capable.”203 Although small, it is efficient, relatively well trained and equipped, 
though dependent on foreign expertise to maintain its more modern systems. According 
to Jane’s Sentinel, the Bahraini Navy has made recent efforts to address this shortcoming 
by increasing the technical expertise of its personnel.204  
Operationally, the Bahraini Navy is no match for larger naval forces in the 
region; however, according to most experts, it should be able to defend Bahrain’s port 
until the arrival of foreign assistance.205 Understandably, it has not contributed to 
international maritime operations,206 such as recent counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of 
Aden, but has been part of cooperative patrols within the region. In 2008, for instance, a 
Bahraini admiral commanded Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152); a U.S. Navy Central 
Command-initiated task force that coordinates cooperative exercises and patrols in the 
Persian Gulf.207 Due to its limited reach and capability, Bahrain depends heavily on 
foreign assistance for its security.208 
c. Kuwait 
Surrounded by larger neighbors, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, Kuwait 
occupies a strategic location in the northern Gulf. It has a troubled history with its 
neighbors, most recently illustrated by the Gulf War invasion in 1991. Kuwait depends 
on its vast oil reserves, most of which are located on land, but a significant proportion 
located within Kuwaiti waters. The main role of the Kuwaiti Navy, therefore, is the 
protection of Kuwaiti interests at sea, to include protection of Kuwait’s major ports and 
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offshore oil facilities. It operates extensively with the U.S. and British forces and both 
states have used Kuwaiti ports to supply their forces in Iraq.209 
Like its Bahraini counterpart, the Kuwaiti Navy is small, comprising only 
2700 personnel, 500 of which are part of the Kuwaiti Coast Guard.210 Its fleet is small 
and less advanced, consisting of eight large patrol craft, three amphibious craft, and two 
support vessels.211 The material question of these vessels is questionable, as well. The 
Kuwaiti Navy suffered greatly during the Gulf War and has received very little support 
since.212 The Kuwaiti Navy serves primarily as a coastal defense force that augments the 
Kuwaiti Coast Guard with border and customs support. Kuwaiti maritime forces patrol 
extensively in their own waters and have even participated in coordinated patrols 
protecting Iraq’s oil transfer facilities, but they seldom operate outside of these areas. As 
a result, Kuwait has not contributed to international maritime operations, such as those 
being conducted in the Gulf of Aden, and would be unable to resist aggression from any 
of its larger neighbors.213 To do so, Kuwaiti forces would require extensive assistance 
from international partners, such as the United States and Great Britain.214 
d. Oman 
Its location on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula provides Oman 
with the opportunity of strategic control of the southern approaches to the Persian Gulf. 
Its coastline extends over 1,000 nautical miles (NM) from the Strait of Hormuz, through 
the Gulf of Oman, and into the Gulf of Aden. Oman shares control of the Strait of  
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Hormuz with Iran, a position that naturally places them at odds with the Islamic Republic 
in most cases. Its long coast and strategic location have ensured that the Royal Navy of 
Oman (RNO) maintains a high priority.215 
The RNO has approximately 4,200 personnel, two surface combatants, 
four large patrol craft, eight small patrol craft, six amphibious vessels, and four support 
vessels. Relatively well trained and equipped, the Omani navy’s role is protection of the 
Strait of Hormuz and coastal defense. Their main adversary in this respect is Iran. Due to 
the lack of mine and anti-submarine platforms, it is not expected to fare very well in 
direct conflict with Iran. As a result, the RNO depends heavily on U.S. and British 
assistance.216  
e. Qatar 
Strategically located in the center of the Persian Gulf, Qatar shares a 
border with Saudi Arabia and natural gas resources with Iran. The Qatari Navy is small 
and, like most of its counterparts, designed solely for coastal defense. It is comprised of 
1,800 personnel, four patrol ships, three missile patrol boats and more than 20 small 
patrol craft.217 It depends heavily on security assistance from the United States and hosts 
a large U.S. headquarters on its soil.218 
C. FACTORS AFFECTING GULF SECURITY COOPERATION 
As discussed in Chapter I, efforts at cooperative security are heavily influenced 
by internal and external factors. Such efforts in the Middle East, and the Gulf region in 
particular, are characterized by four factors: preoccupation with internal stability, 
unresolved animosity between Arab states, Arab fears regarding Iran, and reliance on 
foreign security assistance. The following sections will provide background on each to 
more fully explain the environment in which recent cooperative efforts have begun. 
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1. Internal Stability Versus External Security 
States in the region are obsessed with control and their priorities reflect these 
concerns.  All of the Gulf states depend on varying levels of political and social control to 
ensure their positions of power. Such control is especially important to states in the 
region because their power is based on their ability to keep the population satisfied. 
Although most of the states in question are nominally “democratic,” they depend on 
fundamentally autocratic methods of control. Legitimacy with their populations depends 
on their ability to balance public sentiment. Maintaining this balance has become 
increasingly difficult in the past few decades, primarily because of increasingly disruptive 
socio-economic and political trends. Dramatic population growth, stagnant economic 
markets in the region, and increased exposure to the rest of the world have created 
instability within the region and made control difficult.219  
The situation is further complicated by cultural sentiments. Although economic 
and social globalization have led many in the region to question the legitimacy of 
governments unable to provide a higher standard of living for its people, other factors 
hinder efforts to address these grievances. To many religious leaders, and thereby large 
segments of the population, liberalization is a corruptive force. Globalization, and the 
inherent liberalizing effects it entails, threatens the cultural and religious norms, 
producing a source of opposition to any associated measures. Religious and societal 
leaders, alike, perceive globalization as a corruption of traditional life, while political 
leaders understand that economic success requires modernization. Therefore, political 
leaders in the region must consider the political effects of liberalization and balance 
accordingly. Too much freedom may threaten their position of power, allowing 
opposition to grow in strength and influence. Too little freedom could increase dissent or 
further stagnate their economies.  
Regimes in the region depend on two types of control, which will be briefly 
discussed here as the “carrot” and the “stick.” The “carrot” refers to measures designed to 
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make the population loyal to the regime. In the Middle East, and the Gulf states 
especially, regimes depend on incentives to maintain power. The Gulf monarchies, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, depend mostly on familial or tribal 
connections for legitimacy, and work diligently to satisfy their supporters and population 
through patronage or rents. Patronage, in this case, consists of supplying supporters with 
employment in positions of power within the government or military to ensure their 
support. Rent or the rentier system, implies using government revenue to provide its 
citizens with income, social benefits, or both. In the case of most of the Gulf countries, 
these systems ensure that those who could most directly threaten their control are 
beholden to the regime.  
When these methods fail to ensure support or only partially do so, regimes must 
look to the “stick” to discourage or prevent dissent. The “stick” for most regimes is their 
internal security services. When dissent does occur, it is these forces that protect the 
regime. Accordingly, states in the region invest heavily in their internal security, 
reasoning that external security is worthless if they are no longer in power. When the 
“carrot” fails to entice or maintain loyalty, then the “stick” enforces it by stifling or de-
incentivizing dissent.  
In their preoccupation with internal stability, trying to balance support and dissent 
naturally draws financial and manpower resources away from external security. 
Additionally, it de-emphasizes the importance of cooperation. As regimes look inward, 
they tend to discount external assistance, perceiving such as a sign of weakness that could 
affect their internal stability. Recent drops in oil prices will only exacerbate decisions for 
states in the region, as similar drops affected spending in the previous century.220 
Decreasing income from petroleum and natural gas will undoubtedly require states to 
decide between internal stability and external security.  
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2. The Issue of Neighbors 
As in most areas of the world, relations between neighboring states in the Gulf 
have been historically strained by suspicion and animosity. Longstanding border disputes 
between neighbors have been especially troubling in the Gulf, as most states have 
experienced conflict over the definition of shared boundaries, ownership of strategic 
islands, and the rights to natural resources.221  
Saudi Arabia – The Saudi regime considers itself a regional power and has made 
significant efforts to exert influence over the region. It views itself as the natural balance 
to Iranian influence in the region and, therefore, often finds itself at odds with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Relations with its Arab neighbors in the Gulf have also been influenced 
by this view, as has been illustrated by its attempted dominance over most cooperative 
efforts in the region. Saudi Arabia has been especially dissatisfied with efforts by its 
smaller neighbors to seek external assistance as such efforts tend to erode Riyadh’s 
influence in the region. 222 It has also been critical of efforts between some of these same 
neighbors to cooperate on energy issues. Discussions between Qatar, UAE and Oman, on 
establishing a combined natural gas infrastructure, are perceived by Saudi Arabia as a 
threat to its influence in the region. Plans for the sub-regional grid include a proposed 
pipeline that would allow the smaller states to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, thereby 
lessening the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia on energy trade.223 These recent events 
have only exacerbated standing border disputes between Saudi Arabia and UAE.224 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Yemen continue to face-off over the flow of terrorists, 
weapons, and drugs from Yemen to Saudi Arabia.225  
                                                 
221 Saideh Lotfian, “A Regional Security System in the Persian Gulf,” in Practical Peacemaking in 
the Middle East, Volume I: Arms Control and Regional Security, eds. Steven L. Spiegel et al.  (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1995), 111. 
222 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 312. 
223 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 313; Kate Dourian, “Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia relations pivotal to new gas pipeline plan,” Platts Oilgram News 87:164 (August 21, 2009). 
224 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 273. 
225 Ibid., 244 
 80
United Arab Emirates – UAE has few standing issues with its Arab neighbors. A 
border dispute with Oman was apparently resolved in a 2003 agreement..226 Along with 
the disputes with Saudi Arabia mentioned above, UAE has continuing disputes with 
Qatar and Iran over islands in the Gulf. 
Bahrain – Bahrain has relatively good relations with its Gulf neighbors. Its most 
recent dispute was with Qatar over Hawar Island, but this was settled in international 
court in 2001.227 Most concerning to Bahrain are its relations with Iran, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Kuwait – Kuwait has recently begun to normalize relations with Iraq, but it is hard 
to imagine trust between the two following the Iraqi invasion in 1990. Kuwait has normal 
relations with Saudi Arabia, but the two countries still share a neutral zone established 
after World War II as a result of Saudi aspirations to invade the Kuwaiti kingdom. Oil 
and gas fields shared with Saudi Arabia and Iran provide additional sources of potential 
conflict.228  
Oman – Oman has no “pressing border disputes” but it does have a history with 
Saudi Arabia and UAE, as discussed in a previous section. Although relations with 
Yemen are currently good, the former state of South Yemen did provide support to 
insurgents within Oman during the 1960s and 70s.229 
Qatar – Besides the disputes mentioned above, relations between Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia have recently soured. The Saudi regime is often critical of the Qatari news 
channel, Al Jazeera, which they claim purposefully portrays the Saudi regime 
unfavorably.230 
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Yemen – Has fought border wars with Oman and Saudi Arabia. Former South 
Yemen supported insurgents within Oman during the 1960s and 70s. Saudi Arabia still 
views Yemen as a security risk due to the flow of weapons, drugs, and extremists from 
Yemen into the Saudi kingdom.231 Civil unrest within Yemen in 2009 renewed this 
animosity and prompted Saudi Arabia to deploy land and naval forces to the border.232 
3. Iran and the Arabs 
Iran is convinced it should be a power in the region and is working diligently to 
make it so. It particularly resents foreign intervention and the presence of foreign military 
forces in the Gulf, blaming them for helping perpetuate dependence on the West.233 The 
Gulf states, in turn, feel threatened by Iranian aspirations and depend on U.S. and British 
assistance to offset this threat. Iran’s neighbors are especially worried about continued 
Iranian military development and its support of Islamic extremists in the region.234 In 
addition, many of the Gulf countries feel threatened by Iran’s pursuit of nuclear power 
and the chance that Iran may transition that capability to nuclear weapons.235 Overall, 
most of the Gulf Arab countries consider Iran a “flashpoint” for conflict and a threat to 
stability in the region.236  
Iran and Saudi Arabia – Relations between two of the largest militaries in the 
region are relatively good considering the animosity that existed between them during the 
1980s.237 However, like its smaller neighbors, Saudi Arabia is suspicious of Iranian 
motives in the region. Particularly disconcerting to Riyadh is Iran’s continued 
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development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.238 Consequently, Saudi Arabia’s 
military was developed as a direct counter to Iranian capabilities and its attempts at 
leadership tend to focus on Iran as the greatest threat to security in the region. Saudi 
Arabia’s leadership within the Gulf Cooperative Council, an organization established 
partly as a counter to Iranian economic and political aspirations in the Gulf, best 
illustrates this.239 
Most recently, the two states have traded accusations regarding unrest in Yemen. 
Iran has repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of “state terrorism” for its forays into Yemeni 
territory. While Riyadh claims the Iranian regime supports Houthi rebels that have made 
the Saudi border with Yemen a hotly contested area, it is a claim the rebels and Iran 
deny.240 
Iran and UAE – Disputes over three islands in the southern Persian Gulf continue 
to sour relations between Iran and UAE.241 Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunb 
islands are strategically located on the western entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, making 
them of strategic importance to anyone looking to control the vital waterway. Iran seized 
the islands in 1971, claiming them as part of Iran. Iran considers the matter closed, 
pointing to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreed upon by the two states in 
1971.242 Conversely, UAE still tacitly disputes ownership, arguing that the Iranian 
interpretations of the MOU and their claims to the islands are faulty.243  
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Iran and Bahrain – Although territorial claims on Bahrain made by the Islamic 
Republic appear to have faded with time, mistrust between the two still exists. The 
Bahraini regime claims that Iran has provided support to Shiite dissidents within Bahrain, 
a claim Iran denies. This is an understandably sensitive issue for the Sunni regime, 
considering that native Shiites comprise approximately 75–80 percent of the total 
indigenous population.244 
Qatar and Oman – Iran’s relations with Qatar and Oman are markedly better than 
those with the rest of the Gulf states. Both Qatar and Oman have made efforts to improve 
relations between the GCC and the Islamic Republic, calling for its inclusion in regional 
security discussions.245 In addition, Qatar and Iran share offshore natural gas fields and 
Qatar’s relations with Iran are considered by some to be closer than with its GCC 
partners.246  
4. The Role of External Assistance  
Foreign assistance is a significant factor in the Gulf region. The United Kingdom 
and United States consider security in the region to be a significant part of their own 
national security. As a result, both states have dedicated substantial resources to 
maintaining stability there. These efforts were led by the British who had controlled key 
territory and exerted influence over most of the regimes in the region from the early 19th 
century until 1971.247  By that time, the United States had accumulated sufficient 
influence in the region to allow it to take Britain’s place. Since then, the United States has 
intervened in conflicts between Iran and Iraq during the war in the 1980s and 90s, 
between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, and removed the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in 
2003. 
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However, U.S. involvement in the region is best defined by relations with the 
more peaceful states in the region. Until 2003, the United States and Saudi Arabia 
enjoyed close military relations with U.S. military forces deployed within the country.248 
Other Gulf Arab states host American military forces, as well, including Bahrain, Kuwait, 
and Qatar. Most of the Gulf Arab states depend on U.S. assurances of assistance for their 
security. This dependence arguably reduces the incentive for these states to pursue 
greater cooperation in the region.249 
D. COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
All of these factors have had a significant effect on cooperative relations in the 
Persian Gulf in particular. Tenuous internal control by apprehensive regimes and existing 
animosity between neighbors, combined with overdependence on foreign assistance 
produced an environment adverse to cooperation on almost every level. When 
cooperation has been attempted, it was these factors that determined the success of the 
endeavor. 
The most enduring of such attempts has been the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). Started in 1981, the GCC, although implicitly denying alignment against the 
rising powers of the region, Iran and Iraq, was originally designed to counter the 
increasing influence and threat of the two states.250 Heralded as a comprehensive effort at 
cooperation, the six GCC member states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, UAE, 
and Qatar envisioned an organization able: 
To effect coordination, integration and inter-connection between Member 
States in all fields in order to achieve unity between them.  
To deepen and strengthen relations, links and areas of cooperation now 
prevailing between their peoples in various fields.  
To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:  
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 Economic and financial affairs  
 Commerce, customs and communications 
  Education and culture251 
The GCC charter makes no mention of military or security cooperation and official 
discussion of security cooperation within the GCC did not begin until 1982. During this 
meeting, the GCC states advocated a collective approach to security wherein “any attack 
on any Member State means an attack on all Member States.”252 Despite this initial 
success, the members were unable to agree on a framework for such cooperation mostly 
due to the fears of some members that such measures would lead to interference in the 
internal affairs of the member states. A comprehensive security strategy was adopted by 
the GCC members in 1987 but dealt mostly with trans-border issues such as crime, 
smuggling, airport security, immigration, and border defense.253  
Military cooperation within the GCC began shortly after the founding of the 
GCC. It was also during this time that formation of a Gulf security force was first 
considered.254 Formation of the GCC Rapid Deployment Force was approved in 1982 
and joint exercises began shortly after. A few years later, in 1984, a standing force, the 
Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), was established, and by 1985, the 7,000-man force was 
firmly established. The PSF proved to be notoriously ineffectual. PSF operations are 
inevitably plagued by interoperability and force cohesiveness issues. Manning has also 
been an issue. The PSF continuously maintained only a small standing force, depending 
on force contributions from GCC members during a crisis to fully field the force.255  
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Such operational issues are minor compared to the overall ineffectiveness of GCC 
military and security cooperation. The inability of the GCC to act in response to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 most poignantly illustrates this.256 Attempts at preventing the 
invasion proved ineffectual, as GCC representatives were largely excluded from 
negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait. The GCC states instead joined the U.S.-led 
coalition against Iraq, contributing forces to the overall effort but choosing to remain on 
the fringe, politically. 257 Further attempts by the GCC, at resolving conflict in the region, 
have been almost equally disturbing. The International Court of Justice facilitated the 
resolution of a dispute between Bahrain and Qatar over Hawar Island in 2001 without the 
assistance of the GCC.258 Similarly, a border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 
1992 was only resolved with help by the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak.259  
More recently, the GCC has been able to move forward on discussions concerning 
regional security cooperation. Along with the Arab counter-piracy task force proposed in 
mid 2009, the GCC began to discuss responses to other regional security threats. During a 
meeting held in December 2009, the GCC members agreed to establish a rapid reaction 
force to replace Peninsula Shield.260 However, these recent measures appear to be similar 
to previous attempts at security cooperation and draw equal skepticism on their potential 
effects. 
Overall, the GCC has been hampered by most of the factors mentioned in the 
previous section. Regimes in the region are concerned with maintaining their tenuous 
hold on power, thereby assuring internal stability takes precedence over external security. 
Animosity and suspicion between GCC members has prevented extensive coordination 
within the organization. Such suspicion makes them unwilling to contribute forces to an 
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organization that could potentially be used against them.261 Finally, they are unable to 
justify allocating resources to any endeavor while they are receiving  assurances from the 
United States and other foreign powers interested in the region.  
E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As expected, the two regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, possess the largest 
and most capable maritime forces in the Gulf. However, the smaller states possess 
maritime forces that are smaller yet equally effective in accomplishing their stated 
missions. As in other regions, each state must balance its resources with its desired 
capabilities and, expectedly, varying results can be seen. Beyond issues of 
interoperability and capabilities, however, maritime capacity in the region serves to better  
highlight the political factors that affect cooperation in this area..  
Although the relative lack of maritime capacity in the Persian Gulf is concerning, 
when compared to Southeast Asia, it is the underlying political factors that more 
dramatically affect cooperation in the Gulf area. Regimes in the region are overly 
concerned with maintaining control over their population and depend on their internal 
security forces to do so. By focusing their attention and resources on maintaining internal 
stability, they are ignoring potential external threats. Cooperation is further hindered by 
the presence of conflict between states in the region. The Gulf Arab states that comprise 
the GCC are naturally suspicious of Iran. The smaller Gulf states are almost equally 
suspicious of the aspirations of Saudi Arabia and retain historical animosity between 
them.  
Where the two regions differ is in their reactions to foreign intervention. 
Southeast Asian states, particularly those in the Straits of Malacca, have soundly rejected 
foreign assistance beyond financial aid and training support. The Gulf states, in contrast, 
have embraced foreign support. Although often unofficial in nature, relationships 
between the states in the region and foreign actors, such as the United States and Great 
Britain, include basing foreign troops on their soil. Despite assuring regional security,  
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their presence and the assurances that the United States and other foreign powers have 
given, provide further excuses for the Gulf states to neglect both their own capabilities 
and concerted efforts at security cooperation.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will compare and contrast the nature of maritime security and 
security cooperation in the two regions in question, providing an answer to the question 
posed in the introductory chapter. Specifically, is the Southeast Asian model of maritime 
security cooperation applicable to similar efforts being discussed in the Middle East by 
some of the Persian Gulf states? If so, what lessons can strategic decision-makers and 
military leadership concerned with the region derive from the cooperative security efforts 
in the Southeast Asian maritime domain? 
In the introduction to this thesis, it was postulated that maritime capacity and 
political willingness are the most important factors affecting security cooperation 
between regional states. The lack of the former, and a conciliatory approach with regards 
to the latter, naturally lead to more effective cooperative efforts. Therefore, recent 
cooperative efforts in Southeast Asia were presented as a “model” of regional maritime 
security cooperation that could be applied to similar efforts in the Persian Gulf. Of 
specific interest were cooperative counter-piracy efforts in the Straits of Malacca and 
their applicability to similar efforts in the Gulf of Aden (GOA)  
This final chapter will argue that the Southeast Asian “model” of maritime 
security cooperation, although informative for similar cooperative efforts in the Middle 
East, merely highlights the inadequacies facing the Gulf states as they develop such 
relationships. Southeast Asia and the states of the Persian Gulf share similar 
characteristics related to maritime capacity and political willingness, however, there are 
key differences between the two regions that have already and may continue to hinder 
comparable success in the Gulf. The main argument of this thesis is that political 
willingness is the primary hindrance to cooperative security success in the region. The 
cumulative effect of prioritization of resources, regional animosity, and dependence on 
foreign security assistance has prevented and will continue to prevent efforts at security 
cooperation in the seas of the region. In this regard, the Southeast Asian model is not 
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directly applicable to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, but serves to inform observers of 
the absence of key factors present during the development of cooperative maritime 
security in the Straits of Malacca.  
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section will discuss the 
importance of maritime capacity to operational success and overall cooperation in the two 
regions. In this section, the overall state of maritime capacity in each region will be 
compared to explain how maritime capacity has affected each region and its attempts at 
cooperation. The second section will compare the level of political willingness for 
cooperation in each region. In this section, similarities and differences between factors 
related to the propensity of states, in each region, to seek the aid of its regional neighbors 
will be compared. The goal of this comparison is to identify key factors that have 
influenced cooperation in Southeast Asia that are applicable to similar efforts in the 
Middle East. The third section will summarize the comparison and provide an answer to 
the questions posed by this thesis. The chapter concludes with recommendations to 
encourage and facilitate more effective maritime security cooperation in the Middle East 
and between the states of the Persian Gulf in particular, and with recommendations for 
further research. 
B. DOES MARITIME CAPACITY INFLUENCE COOPERATION? 
In the introduction to this thesis, it was postulated that maritime capacity is a 
determining factor in a state’s decision to cooperate in a regional setting. The decision to 
cooperate by states in Southeast Asia was given as an example of states realizing they 
lacked the capacity required to successfully address issues in the maritime domain. Many 
of the individual states in the region complain that they have too few ships to patrol their 
own waters and, in turn, are unable to prevent piracy and maritime crime even within 
their own waters. Similarly, in the opinion of some policy and security experts, the 
Middle East has similar capacity issues that need to be addressed and, once resolved, 
should lead to greater cooperation between these states. 
Maritime capacity has been an issue for the states of both regions since they 
became independent and established their own governments. In Southeast Asia, maritime 
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capacity has been most affected by financial issues. The rise of piracy coincided with the 
Southeast Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s and the resulting economic instability 
significantly reduced financial resources available to apply to maritime forces. This 
adversely affected maritime capacity through the mid-2000s, when most states in the 
region began to dedicate resources to bolster their maritime capacity. This shift can be 
directly attributed to domestic and international pressure to address the rise of piracy in 
the Straits of Malacca, as discussed in Chapter III. Most responded by increasing 
acquisition of new vessels through domestic and foreign sources, improving training for 
their forces, and expanding cooperation between neighboring states.  
Conversely, maritime capacity in the Middle Eastern Gulf states has been most 
affected by issues of priority. Granted, a few of the Gulf states deal with financial 
constraints, but most possess ready sources of income from their oil and natural gas 
resources. With the exception of Bahrain and Yemen, states in the region are in a far 
better financial state than their Southeast Asian counterparts in terms of available 
financial resources. Therefore, the issue of maritime capacity in the region focuses more 
on the priority maritime forces receive rather than on their lack of funding. States in the 
region are overly concerned with internal stability. Accordingly, regimes in these states 
depend heavily upon internal security forces to maintain control and external security 
forces often serve to augment these forces.262 Another factor that aids in the decision of 
regimes to focus on internal stability versus external security is the protection of external 
actors, such as the United States. The smaller states depend on foreign security assistance 
and assurances. With the United States and others assuring regional security, these states 
are free to focus their resources on assuring internal stability. 
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Maritime forces in both regions are primarily designed for coastal defense. Few of 
the states have “blue water” navies, possessing vessels capable of operating far from land 
for extended periods.263 Even states that have large surface vessels rarely use them in that 
role. All of the states have taken steps to address their inventory shortfalls. Procurement 
from foreign sources has increased, often with aid from external actors, while some states 
have worked to increase their inventory through domestic production.264  
Training and its resulting proficiency remain an issue in both regions. Although 
better trained than in the past, most Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern maritime forces 
still lack the requisite skill sets to effectively address maritime violence and piracy. In 
addition, few of the examined states possess the ability to operate outside of their own 
territorial waters.265 Although lack of power projection capability is not pressing in the 
close waters of the Straits of Malacca, it should concern states in the Middle East, 
considering recent discussions between the Gulf states concerning an Arab counter-piracy 
task force operating in the GOA. This lack of capability has been partially addressed in 
both regions through increases in domestic training, external assistance, and increased 
participation in bilateral maritime exercises with neighbors and external actors. However, 
only Iran and Saudi Arabia can be considered “blue water” capable and the UAE and 
Oman the only other states to be actively pursuing the capability.266  
Reorganization efforts have had a significant impact on capacity in Southeast 
Asia particularly. Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have all restructured their maritime 
forces to improve cross-service capability and focus their efforts on maritime violence 
and piracy in the region. These steps can be seen to have dramatically improved the 
maritime capability of most states in the region. 
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Maritime security cooperation has also been a major contributor to force 
effectiveness in Southeast Asia. Unlike their counterparts in the Middle East, the 
Southeast Asian states have progressively looked to their neighbors to increase their 
overall effectiveness. The Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP) and ReCAAP have 
contributed significantly to overall maritime security in the region by streamlining 
information-sharing functions, deconflicting regional maritime operations, and 
combining maritime resources. The Malacca Straits Sea Patrols and its predecessors have 
allowed greater coordination between members, allowing for more effective utilization of 
their forces. Although not operationally significant, the ASEAN-led ReCAAP agreement 
has focused attention on maritime security in the region as a whole. It has provided a 
framework for communication and cooperation that has become a norm in the region, 
increasing coordination at the operational and tactical level. Overall, the combination of 
more vessels, improved capability, and increased coordination has allowed states in the 
Straits of Malacca to more effectively patrol their own waters, thus decreasing maritime 
crime in the region. 
This relationship does not exist in the Middle East. The most significant 
cooperative organization in the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council, is notoriously inept 
at military and security cooperation, owing largely to existing suspicion between 
members and the lack of a unifying threat. Bilateral relationships exist between states in 
the region but lack the extent of coordination and communication of Southeast Asian 
efforts. Recent discussions between the GCC states indicate that greater cooperation in 
the maritime domain is desired, however, most states in the region would be physically 
unable to contribute forces to a maritime force operating out of range of their own waters. 
Cooperation with external actors is one area where both regions differ. Although 
states in both regions actively cooperate and exercise with foreign navies, the nature of 
these relationships are decidedly different in each. In Southeast Asia, foreign intervention 
in security matters has long been viewed with suspicion, and relations with external 
actors were noticeably distant. For example, most navies in the region conduct regular 
exercises with the United States and accept training and financial assistance from other 
external actors. However, most attempts to closely cooperate or coordinate operations 
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between them have been viewed with suspicion and often flatly refused. Conversely, in 
the Persian Gulf, most of the states rely heavily on foreign assistance and aid to ensure 
their external security. Most of the smaller states there have de facto security 
arrangements with the United States and Great Britain, even basing foreign forces on 
their own soil.267 This dependence has adverse affects on overall capacity, as states that 
do not have to worry about their external security are free to focus their resources and 
attention on other issues. 
Overall, the relative disparity of maritime capacity would indicate that the Gulf 
states should be eager to initiate cooperative maritime security arrangements. Only Iran 
and Saudi Arabia compare closely to the Southeast Asian states, as can be seen in Figure 
5. 
 
Figure 5.   Comparison of the Persian Gulf and Straits of Malacca (2009)268 
                                                 
267 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 14–18. 
268 NOTE: Figure 5 shows a comparison of the approximate number of maritime surface vessels 
including navy, coast guard, or other maritime service branch inventories of the states being compared 
SOURCE: Figures were compiled from Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments for each of the states as 
well as Anthony H Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan’s book, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of 
Assymetric Wars. 
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In fact, most of the states in the Gulf have maritime forces that are significantly 
smaller than those of the least capable of the Southeast Asian states. Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand were more willing to cooperate on maritime security, yet they 
have larger maritime forces than their Gulf counterparts. Despite their shortcomings, Gulf 
Arab states have been unable or unwilling to organize a meaningful cooperative effort.269 
Even the growing maritime force of Iran and the increasing potential instability of the 
Iranian regime have done little to encourage cooperation between them. This would seem 
to indicate that insufficient maritime capacity in the region may not provide sufficient 
motivation for cooperation, unlike Southeast Asia where maritime sufficient capacity is 
an accepted factor leading to cooperation. Therefore, there must be other factors that have 
prevented cooperation from becoming a priority for states in the region. 
C. POLITICAL WILL AND REGIONAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY 
Considering the relatively low importance of insufficient maritime capacity to 
states in the Persian Gulf, it is logical to conclude that some other factor must be 
hindering cooperation in the region. Therefore, willingness to seek greater cooperation on 
security matters in a region must depend more heavily on issues that are more political in 
nature. As discussed in the introductory chapters, development of regional security 
cooperation relies on the willingness of states to seek assistance from the whole rather 
than on their own. These factors include internal stability, intra-regional relations, and the 
influence of external actors.  
On the surface, Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf region are strikingly similar 
with regards to most of these factors. Regimes in both regions rely heavily on their 
internal security forces, and in some instances their external security forces, to maintain 
internal stability and ensure that they retain power. Likewise, most of the states in both 
regions face internal pressure from the social, economic and political effects of 
globalization and the destabilizing influence of violent and nonviolent religious 
extremism. These internal pressures draw attention away from external security, as a state 
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that worries about losing power is naturally reluctant to expand its external commitments 
or shift financial and manpower resources.  
Likewise, both regions have a history of conflict between neighbors. Although not 
always violent in nature, states in both regions often view their neighbors with suspicion. 
Standing border disputes are commonplace and agreed-upon borders guarded jealously, 
making operations along them extremely sensitive. Therefore, it is easy to understand the 
hesitancy of states in both areas to coordinate across borders, even in instances of “hot 
pursuit.” Although relations between most of the states in both regions have cooled 
significantly in the past few decades, cooperation is still heavily influenced by instinctual 
protectiveness. In Southeast Asia, the evolution of cooperation has transitioned through a 
logical sequence of bilateral then multilateral maritime cooperation, as illustrated by the 
MSSP and ReCAAP. The Gulf states are similar in that most have existing bilateral and 
multilateral relationships between them, but differ in the level of observable cooperation 
on matters of maritime security. The closest example they have is the GCC military force, 
Peninsula Shield (PSF), but cooperation and coordination within the PSF appears tacit at 
best. 
More concerning to the potential development of cooperation in the Persian Gulf 
has been the role of external actors. External influence has ramifications on any regional 
effort at cooperation and the Gulf region provides a poignant example of this. Unlike the 
Southeast Asia states, the Gulf states are heavily dependent on foreign assistance and 
security assurances. U.S. protection is especially important to the smaller states, which 
fear the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia, within the region, over cooperation. U.S. 
influence in the region is obvious, with U.S. forces still active in Iraq and occupying 
bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, U.S. naval forces patrolling the Persian Gulf and 
Gulf of Aden, and military advisors and trainers providing less intrusive military 
assistance to Saudi, Yemeni, and Omani forces. Only Iran rejects U.S. intervention in the 
region and refuses to discuss regional security cooperation with U.S. forces remaining in 
the region. Dependence on the United States and other external actors reduces the 
incentive for states in the region to cooperate between them. If they can depend on the 
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United States to protect them externally, why should they be concerned with developing 
the capabilities of their own forces or fostering regional cooperation? 
D. CONCLUSION 
Recent discussions between the GCC countries, regarding increased cooperation 
on regional maritime security issues, should elicit discussion within the academic and 
U.S. policy circles. Literature on the subject of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and 
West Indian Ocean has focused on the applicability of the Southeast Asian “model” of 
counter-piracy to the region. Beyond the operational and tactical aspects of this model, 
experts and policy makers should be concerned with the lessons inherent in the 
development of this model. To simply “cut and paste” the steps taken by the states in 
Southeast Asia, and attempt to apply them to similar efforts in the Middle East, is not 
sufficient. Such comparisons do, however, provide an opportunity to compare the 
progression of events that led to success in Southeast Asia. Discussion on how these 
events and the geo-political factors inherent in them led to the level of cooperation in the 
region is worthwhile and was the overall goal of this thesis.  
In many ways, the geopolitical environment in both regions is largely the same. 
Both regions have histories of internal instability, where regimes must seek balance 
between what maintains the loyalty of the population and assures continued control over 
the mechanisms of power in the state. Both regions possess histories of intra-regional 
conflict: violent and nonviolent conflict between neighbors, illustrated by border 
disputes, military invasions, or support of political oppositions within another state. 
Where the two diverge is in relation to external influences. Although states in both 
regions inherently eschew foreign intervention as a whole, geopolitical realities have 
caused more vulnerable states to seek the aid of external powers. Unlike in Southeast 
Asia, where the states reject foreign assistance and meddling beyond traditional financial 
assistance, training, and bilateral exercises, the Gulf states have sought the protection of 
the United States and others.  
In some ways, this protection has taken on the characteristics of dependence. 
Where the Southeast Asian states looked to each other for mutual protection, the Gulf 
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states have sought continued assurances of regional security externally, creating an 
environment where regional cooperation is perceived as unnecessary. This dependence 
has not only affected efforts at cooperation, it has affected the development of their 
armed forces, allowing states in the region to focus on other issues at the cost of reducing 
their overall military capability and stalling efforts at increasing interoperability in their 
established “joint” forces, such as the PSF.  
Overall, the Southeast Asian “model” of maritime security cooperation is 
informative for recent Gulf state discussions, but lacks the applicability most experts 
attribute to it. It mainly provides a counterpoint for comparison between the two in that 
the gradual development of a cooperative tradition as seen in Southeast Asia is unlikely 
in the Persian Gulf. The Southeast Asian states gradually developed a cooperative 
tradition free from external intervention. The success of maritime security cooperation in 
Southeast Asia can be seen as an evolutionary process progressing from one level to 
another, eventually leading to its present, multilateral form. By simultaneously 
addressing issues of capacity and political will at varying levels, states in the region were 
able to increase their maritime capabilities and build confidence in each other. Through 
trial and error, regional actors gradually gained confidence in the intentions of their 
neighbors and developed boundaries regarding their relationships with extra-regional 
actors. Likewise, regional political sensitivities and reduced capacity required regional 
and extra-regional actors to reconsider their efforts and decide upon new courses of 
action.  
In contrast, cooperative efforts in the Persian Gulf have been adversely affected 
by the choice of Gulf states to rely on external intervention and discount the need for 
cooperative security. After more than two decades, the GCC remains a “hollow shell” of 
what it could be with regards to security cooperation.270 Its joint military and security 
endeavors have proven ineffectual despite several opportunities to exert influence. With 
the exception of Iran, who has initiated unilateral counter-piracy operations, Gulf Arab 
maritime forces are virtually absent from counter-piracy efforts in the GOA. The 
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European Union, North American Treaty Organization, and the United States lead those 
efforts, highlighting the propensity of the Gulf states to depend on external protection. 
Regardless of the lack of urgency the piracy issue is to them, the Gulf states have once 
again allowed their external security to be “outsourced.” That is why recent 
announcements by the Gulf Arab states, that they were considering contributing to 
maritime security in the GOA, were viewed derisively by this author and provided the 
impetus for this thesis.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The hypothesis espoused in the previous section suggests that continued foreign 
influence is detrimental to long-term security in the region. It leads one to consider that 
only the withdrawal of foreign forces would lead states in the region to truly understand 
the incentives of regional security cooperation by removing the primary point of 
contention and source of dependence. Logically, this would further suggest that if the 
United States wishes to encourage greater maritime security cooperation and coordination 
in the Gulf, it should significantly reduce its presence or completely withdraw from the 
region. 
Obviously such steps would be foolhardy in terms of their geopolitical effect. 
Protection of U.S. strategic interests necessitates U.S. involvement in the region. The 
global economy depends on Middle Eastern oil and gas. The threat of Islamic extremism 
continues to be a particular concern of the United States. Unstable states in the region 
could provide havens for extremist groups to train and operate, a lesson learned from 
Afghanistan. A stable Middle East, therefore, is a cornerstone of U.S. policy, and stability 
in the region is presently the purview of the United States. 
Accordingly, the United States expends a significant amount of effort to ensure 
stability in the region. It has fought two recent wars, dedicates valuable military assets to 
protect the region, and provides substantial aid to states in the region. An abrupt cessation 
of these efforts could create a vacuum that could be quickly filled by groups hostile to the 
United States and increase the potential for conflict in the region.  Therefore, continued 
U.S. assistance is required to maintain regional stability. However, the United States 
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should begin to reduce the “exposure” that current policies have on the phenomenon of 
dependence in the region. The following steps are recommended to begin to reduce 
dependence on the United States: 
Make capacity building “joint” and “enabling” — Tailor capacity building 
initiatives to encourage joint capability and interoperability. Such changes should stress 
the need for shared systems, procedures, and multilateral coordination. Additionally, 
capacity building should focus on enabling regional forces to adequately address their 
own external threats versus acquiring the newest, “shiniest” systems.271  
“Enable” regional cooperation — The United states must gradually foster 
regional cooperation by seeking to strengthen existing bilateral relationships between 
states in the region. This includes encouraging bilateral military exercises, assisting in the 
establishment of regional coordination centers designed to facilitate information sharing 
and coordination, and ensuring the existence of robust military liaison programs between 
the states. Due to regional sensitivities pertaining to U.S. intervention, such efforts must 
be handled through unofficial channels and include minimal U.S. presence. Eventually, 
states in the region must be encouraged to strengthen military ties by improving the 
interoperability of their combined forces, streamlining information-sharing practices, and 
increasing coordination between all forces in the region. 
Reduce the U.S. “footprint” in the region — Eventually, the U.S. military 
presence in the region should be reduced. By enabling forces in the region to adequately 
address their own external threats and gradually strengthening bilateral and multilateral 
relationships, the United States can reduce its presence in the region while assuring 
relative stability. Reduced U.S. presence would effectively neutralize Iranian complaints 
of foreign meddling and could help normalize relations with the Islamic Republic. 
Ideally, by developing the maritime capacity of each state in the region toward 
increased interoperability and enabling the development of cooperative tradition, the 
United States should be able to slowly distance itself from intervening in regional 
security affairs. Gradually deemphasizing the importance of U.S. intervention to those 
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states that depend on such assistance should lessen the overall impact of such a 
withdrawal. Additionally, a reduction of foreign presence in the region should have a de-
escalatory effect on Iranian rhetoric and allow for greater dialogue between the Gulf 
states and their northern neighbor. 
F. IMPETUS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Obviously, the scope of this thesis was ambitious; it was designed to highlight the 
obvious similarities and differences between cooperation in each region. More in-depth 
analysis of the effect of political factors on cooperation in the Gulf would be extremely 
useful to policy experts and decision makers. The greater understanding of the role of 
maritime capacity as motivation toward greater cooperation within a region and then as a 
facilitator for greater cooperation as the arrangement progresses would be especially 
beneficial. Additionally, further analysis of the role of the United States and other foreign 
actors on cooperative efforts in the region would be warranted, including discussions of 
the effect the absence of foreign assistance would have on the geopolitical situation. 
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